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CRIMINOLOGY
DESISTANCE AND THE "FEARED SELF":
TOWARD AN IDENTITY THEORY OF
CRIMINAL DESISTANCE
RAY PATERNOSTER* & SHAWN BUSHWAY**
This Article develops both a framework for a theory of desistance from
crime and an analytical strategy with which to examine desistance. With
respect to the former, an identity theory of the desistance from crime that is
more cognitive and individualistic than some and more forward-looking
than others is sketched out. This framework contributes to and
complements existing theoretical arguments by building upon the work of
others through integrating several diverse bodies of work that range from
social psychology to collective movements in sociology. In this framework,
offenders have "working selves" as criminal offenders with a set of
preferences and social networks consistent with that self In addition to the
working self, or the self in the present, there is a future, or possible, self
that consists both of desires as to what the person wishes or hopes to
become (the positive possible sell) and anxiety over what they fear they may
become (the feared sell). Persons are committed to their working self until
they determine that the cost of this commitment is greater than the benefits.
A perception that one may in fact turn out to become the feared self, a
perception assisted by the linking of life failures, or what has been called
the "crystallization of discontent, "provides the initial motivation to change
the self. This initial motivation brings with it a change in preferences and
social networks that stabilize the newly emerging self This identity theory
of desistance can be empirically developed by thinking about it in terms of a
structural break in an individual-level time series of offending. This theory
* Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice, Maryland Population Research Center,
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and the process of desistance itself can be profitably examined by
examining such time series of offending over a long time period at the
individual level.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, criminological theorists have presumed that what they
needed to explain was initiation into, and persistence in, criminal behavior.
The central question, then, was, "Why do people start offending, and why
do they continue offending?" Interest in the "career criminal" in the early
1980s changed all this as criminologists became concerned about
dimensions of offending other than onset and persistence, such as the
duration of offending over time, escalation from less serious to more
serious offending, and the eventual termination of or desistance from crime.
Once they recognized that desistance from crime might be an important and
distinct dimension of the criminal career, criminologists scrambled for
possible theoretical explanations that ranged from simple extensions of old
theories' to new theories specifically designed to explain desistance.2
1 See generally ROBERT AGNEw, WHY Do CRIMINALS OFFEND? A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (2005); RONALD L. AKERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE (1998).
2 See generally JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT
LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70 (2003); SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: How Ex-
CONVICTS REFORM AND BUILD THEIR LIVES (2001); Stephen Farrall, On the Existential
Aspects of Desistance from Crime, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 367 (2005); Peggy C.
Giordano, Stephen A. Cemkovich & Jennifer L. Rudolph, Gender, Crime, and Desistance:
Toward a Theory of Cognitive Transformation, 107 AM. J. SOC. 990 (2002) [hereinafter
Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance]; Peggy C. Giordano, Stephen A.
Cemkovich & Ryan D. Schroeder, Emotions and Crime Over the Life Course: A Neo-
Median Perspective on Criminal Continuity and Change, 112 AM. J. Soc. 1603 (2007)
[hereinafter Giordano et al., Emotions and Crime]. This does not, of course, mean that
desistance from crime was neither noticed nor explained prior to the advent of the criminal
career debate. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, for example, may have been the first to
empirically document the general decline in criminal conduct over the life course. See
SHELDON & ELEANOR GLUECK, OF DELINQUENCY AND CRIME (1974); SHELDON & ELEANOR
GLUECK, DELINQUENTS AND NONDELINQUENTS IN PERSPECTIVE (1968); SHELDON & ELEANOR
GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950); SHELDON & ELEANOR GLUECK,
CRIMINAL CAREERS IN RETROSPECT (1943). While not developing a "theory" as to why
desistance occurred, the Gluecks did suggest it was due to a process of gradual maturation.
Similarly, David Matza observed that over time most delinquents "mature out" of offending.
See DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT (1964). Finally, Travis Hirschi used the
decline in offending beginning in late adolescence as a vehicle to criticize strain and cultural
deviance theories of crime as well as to promote his own social control theory, which he
thought could adequately account for desistance. See TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF
DELINQUENCY (1969).
DESISTANCE AND THE "FEARED SELF"
In this Article, we present an identity theory of desistance that builds
upon and complements the work of these other theories 3 by integrating a
diverse body of literature in social psychology, behavioral economics, and
collective movements in sociology. We draw upon a distinction between,
on the one hand, one's current or working identity and, on the other, the
kind of person that one wishes to be-and, more importantly, not be-in
the future: one's possible self4  Offenders have working identities as
persons who, among other things, have and will commit criminal acts. This
working identity remains a locus of commitment as long as it is thought to
be successful or, more specifically, as long as, on average, it nets more
benefits than costs. Gradually, however, the working identity of "criminal
offender" becomes less and less satisfying. The process is a measured one
and only occurs when perceived failures and dissatisfactions within
different domains of life become connected and when current failures
become linked with anticipated future failures. These failures include a
sense that being an offender is no longer financially beneficial, that it is too
dangerous, that the perceived costs of imprisonment loom more likely and
greater, and that the costs to one's social relationships are too dear.
When these life dissatisfactions become linked to one's criminal
identity, they are more likely to be projected into the future, and the person
begins to think of his or her "self' as one who would like to change to be
something else. This perceived sense of a future or possible self as a non-
offender coupled with the fear that without change one faces a bleak and
highly undesirable future provides the initial motivation to break from
crime. Movement toward the institutions that support and maintain
desistance (legitimate employment or association with conventional others,
for example) is unlikely to take place until the possible self as non-offender
is contemplated and at least initially acted upon. Human agency, we
believe, is expressed through this act of intentional self-change. 5 Further,
3 See generally MARUNA, supra note ; NEAL SHOVER, GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND
CAREERS OF PERSISTENT THIEVES (1996); Farrall, supra note ; Giordano et al., Gender,
Crime, and Desistance, supra note.
4 See generally Hazel Markus & Paula Nurius, Possible Selves: The Interface Between
Motivation and the Self-Concept, in SELF AND IDENTITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 157,
157-72 (K. Yardley & T. Honess eds., 1987) [hereinafter Markus & Nurius, Interface];
Hazel Markus & Paula Nurius, Possible Selves, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 954 (1986)
[hereinafter Markus & Nurius, Possible Selves].
5 See generally MARGARET S. ARCHER, MAKING OUR WAY THROUGH THE WORLD:
HUMAN REFLEXIVITY AND SOCIAL MOBILITY (2007) [hereinafter ARCHER, MAKING OUR
WAY]; MARGARET S.ARCHER, BEING HUMAN: THE PROBLEM OF AGENCY (2000) [hereinafter
ARCHER, BEING HUMAN]; K. Jill Kiecolt & J. Beth Mabry, Agency in Young Adulthood:
Intentional Self-Change Among College Students, 5 Advances in Life Course Res. 181
(2000).
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this change in identity brings with it a change in one's preferences (for
crime, drugs, "wild" peers) and one's orientation to the future, such that
causal factors have a different impact on the person now than in the past. In
understanding desistance as literally a "break with the past," something
changes about the person, such as his or her identity and preferences, so that
the causal processes moving behavior are different across the different time
periods.
Though similar in some ways to the work of Shadd Maruna, Stephen
Farrall, and Peggy Giordano et al.,6 our theory both builds upon and extends
their theories in important ways. Giordano et al.'s most recent symbolic
interactionist approach heavily stresses the influence of social processes-
social interactions, social experiences, socially derived emotions, and social
influences-in developing both the motive to change through self-
improvement and self-modification and the means to do so.7 Relationships
with conventional others, primarily romantic partners, plays a prominent
role in their theory, which they admit "steers us away from a view of
cognitive transformations as deriving from individualistic mental
processes., 8  In the theory developed here, intentional self-change is
understood to be more cognitive, internal, and individual, at least initially,
with new social networks approached and mobilized subsequent to the
emergence of the new, conventional identity. 9 While we think that the
kinds of conventional social relationships and role-taking described by
Giordano et al.10 are important and necessary parts of the desistance
process, we think that these are not accessed until after offenders first
decide to change and then actually begin to change their sense of who they
are. In addition, we place greater emphasis on the notion of the "feared
6 See Farrall, supra note ; Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance, supra note ;
MARUNA, supra note ; see also Stephen Farrall & Shadd Maruna, Desistance-Focused
Criminal Justice Policy Research, 43 How. J. CRIM. JUST. 358 (2004); Shadd Maruna,
Desistance from Crime and Explanatory Style: A New Direction in the Psychology of
Reform, 20 J. COrEMP. CRIM. JUST. 184 (2004); Shadd Maruna & Kevin Roy, Amputation
or Reconstruction? Notes on the Concept of "Knifing Off' and Desistance from Crime, 23 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 104 (2007).
7 Giordano et al., Emotions and Crime, supra note, at 1608-16.
s Id. at 1607.
9 We are not implying that identity forms without social interaction, for the shift toward a
new identity is a social product, as persons "try out" their new role on others. Here we are
arguing that whole-scale shifts in social networks and some opportunities for new social
roles, such as marriage partner or employee, must be based at least in part on new identities
that are both projected by self and at least tentatively validated or accepted by others. We
will argue in a later section of this paper, infra Part V, that it is important for the success of
the change process that others support the new self or at the very least not actively oppose it.
10 Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance, supra note ; Giordano et al., Emotions
and Crime, supra note.
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self'-an image of what the person does not want to become as an initial
source of motivation for intentional self-change among those with a
"spoiled identity."'" As we will discuss in more detail in Part V, our theory
is fundamentally different from that of Giordano and her colleagues in
2007,12 and more cognitive and individualistic than the work of Giordano
and her colleagues in 2002.13
Our view is more compatible with Farrall's 14 and Maruna's15 position
that "sustained desistance most likely requires a fundamental and
intentional shift in a person's sense of self." We agree wholeheartedly both
that desistance requires a fundamental change in how a person views herself
and her world and that it is intentional. Desistance, when it occurs,
generally involves a deliberate act of self-change-a "break with the past"
that occurs both in a metaphorical and, as we argue in Part IV, in an
analytical sense as well. 16  There are, however, important differences
between our theory and Maruna's. In Maruna's view, offenders who "make
good" do not craft different, more conventional identities than those they
had in the past to provide both the motivation and direction for change.
17
Rather, offenders who already have prosocial views of themselves in the
present deliberately distort their pasts to make past criminal actions both
explicable and consistent with their current favorable views of who they are
and what they are "really like." For Maruna's offenders, "[D]esisting is
framed as just another adventure consistent with their life-long personality,
not as a change of heart. Again, this allows the individual to frame his or
her desistance as a case of personality continuity rather than change."'18 The
"upfront" work that the desisting offenders described in Maruna's theory
do, then, is to change their understanding or interpretation of their criminal
pasts, so that it is consistent with their current views of themselves as a
"good" person.' 9  This reinterpretation involves a "willful cognitive
distortion" of the past to align it with the present and is the cognitive work
described as "making good.",20 Desistance does not seem to require, as it
does in our theory, the notion that the offender casts off his old identity in
I ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 41-104
(1963).
12 Giordano et al., Emotions and Crime, supra note.
B Giordano et al., Gender, Crime and Desistance, supra note.
14 Farrall, supra note , at 368-69.
15 MARUNA, supra note, at 17.
16 See Kiecolt & Maybry, supra note.
17 MARUNA, supra note, at 88-92.
18 Id. at 154.
19 Id.
20 Id at 9.
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favor of a new one.2' Moreover, this theory does not require, as ours does,
a description of the process that leads to a disenchantment with crime or a
criminal identity, the appeal of a new, conventional identity, nor how that
new identity must be built up.
Finally, our theory is decidedly different from that of Robert Sampson
and John Laub. Again, we will take up this issue in more detail in Part V,
but it is necessary to point out here that Sampson and Laub take deliberate
steps to separate themselves from any suggestion that identity change is
necessary for desistance to occur and place far less emphasis than we do on
the role of human agency in desistance. In their more structural theory of
desistance, Sampson and Laub argue that behavioral change comes about as
a result of one's involvement in conventional roles (such as stable worker
or good husband), and therefore comes about more often than not without
the person either planning or actively participating in it (desistance by
default).23 In Part V, we will more clearly point out the differences between
our theory and Sampson and Laub's, and make clear our unique
contribution to the understanding of desistance.
Our theory of desistance casts the decision to quit crime as just that-a
decision by an offender that she has "had enough" of crime and being a
criminal and desires a change in what she does and who she is. In our view,
desistance comes about as a result of the offender willfully changing his
identity and both working toward something positive in the future and
steering away from something feared. As we will describe it in this Article,
this change in identity is slow and gradual. The movement toward
accessing social supports (or "hooks") for change is just as tentative and
inconsistent.2 4 Deliberate self-change and desistance are not captured in a
moment, nor are they events, but they constitute a process occurring over
time. Moreover, since we think that desistance from crime involves
21 Although we will be discussing the role of identity and desistance from crime
generally, it will be obvious to most that notions of identity and crime are pervasive in the
criminal justice system. For example, in determining what kind of punishment and how
much to punish, judges certainly consider what kind of person they assume the convicted to
be: remorseful and heading in the "right direction" or unrepentant and likely to offend again.
To the extent that correctional programs still try to engage in rehabilitation, they attempt to
change the identity of the inmate with the expectation that such a change will lead to
conformity or desistance upon release. There is in fact a vast literature on the use of
rehabilitation to reduce offending by changing offenders' identities that the interested reader
may seek out; however, that topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
22 ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND
TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE (1993); Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Life-Course
Desisters? Trajectories of Crime Among Delinquent Boys Followed to Age 70, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 555 (2003).
23 SAMPSON & LAUB, supra note , at 278-79; Sampson & Laub, supra note.
24 See Giordano et al., Gender, Crime and Desistance, supra note, at 1033-36.
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important changes in a person's identity, tastes, values, and preferences, we
are explicit that desistance is about both a change in the propensity to
commit crime and its opportunity.25 Finally, while the process of desistance
is a gradual one, when the offender's identity has changed, she has, in a
metaphorical sense, "broken with the past" in that things that once mattered
now do not (or matter much less), and things that did not matter before now
do (or matter a little more).
As a second contribution, we very briefly present an analytical
approach to illustrate and eventually test our ideas about desistance that
further extends the current literature's focus on desistance as a process. The
original understanding of desistance in the criminal career paradigm
focused on desistance as a discrete event where one went from offender to
non-offender. Jeffrey Fagan first recognized desistance as a process rather
than an event, differentiating the process of desistance, defined as the
reduction in the frequency and severity of offending, from the event of
26quitting crime or no longer committing offenses. Marc LeBlanc and
Marcel Frrchette also referred to desistance as a set of processes that led to
the cessation of crime.27 Laub and Sampson explicitly separated the
process of desistance from the termination of offending, which they view as
the outcome of desistance.28 Shawn Bushway et al. proposed using growth
curve models that describe the change in latent propensity to commit crime
over time to identify desisters.29 These methods, particularly the group-
based trajectory models developed by Daniel Nagin and Kenneth Land, can
identify long-term changes in offending propensity over time.30 Bushway
et al. demonstrated that desisters defined using these methods are
dramatically different than desisters defined by more traditional static
methods (for example, clinical cutoffs). 31  The group-based trajectory
25 Gottfredson and Hirschi describe this phenomenon as a change in both criminality and
crime. MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME (1990).
26 Jeffrey Fagan, Cessation of Family Violence: Deterrence and Dissuasion, in 1 1 CRIME
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 377 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds.,
1989).
27 MARC LEBLANC & MARCEL FRtCHETTE, MALE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY FROM CHILDHOOD
THROUGH YOUTH: MULTILEVEL AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES (1989).
28 John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, in 28
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael H. Tonry ed., 2001).
29 Shawn Bushway et al., An Empirical Framework for Studying Desistance as a
Process, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 491 (2001).
30 Daniel S. Nagin & Kenneth C. Land, Age, Criminal Careers, and Population
Heterogeneity: Specification and Estimation of a Nonparametric Mixed Poisson Model, 31
CRIMINOLOGY 327 (1993).
31 Shawn D. Bushway, Terence P. Thornberry & Marvin D. Krohn, Desistance as a
Developmental Process: A comparison of Static and Dynamic Approaches, 19 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 129 (2003).
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method has now been used repeatedly to describe offending over different
parts of the life course.32 While each set of analyses identifies a subset of
people with relatively flat long-term patterns of offending, the more typical
pattern is a period of increasing propensity of offending followed by a long-
term decline in offending, which usually reaches very low or non-existent
levels of offending propensity by the end of the period. Offenders who
follow this pattern are referred to by both sets of authors as desisters. 33
These long-term analyses of crime make two important contributions
to the study of desistance. First, they explicitly conceptualize desistance
not as the static state of not offending but as the process of movement over
time from a high or non-trivial level of offending to one that is not
significantly different from zero. Second, they implicitly acknowledge the
importance of long-term patterns of offending as involving a time series at
the individual level. Analysis of time series data is a separate and rich area
of statistics that is more commonly associated with the study of aggregate
time trends in criminology. However, there is nothing inherent in
individual-level data that precludes the use of time series regression. The
fact that there are many individual time series, represented in a panel, adds
to the richness of the data, but it does not negate the need to take the basic
time series character of the data into account. Moreover, prior theories of
desistance and the one developed in this Article implicate individual-level
time-series offending data.
In Part IV, using data from the Cambridge Study in Delinquency
Development, we will show that the desistance process is inherently a non-
stationary time series. 34 Non-stationary means that some basic parameter of
the model is not time-stable. This instability has dramatic implications for
the study of desistance, since non-stationary series are not amenable to
standard regression techniques unless they are first made stationary. The
most dramatic way of making a time series stationary is to study first
32 See, e.g., Arjan A.J. Blokland, Daniel Nagin & Paul Nieuwbeerta, Life Span Offending
Trajectories of a Dutch Conviction Cohort, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 919 (2005); Alex R. Piquero,
Taking Stock of Developmental Trajectories of Criminal Activity over the Life Course, in
THE LONG VIEW OF CRIME: A SYNTHESIS OF LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH 23 (Akiva M.
Liberman ed., 2008); Sampson & Laub, supra note ; see also Arjan A.J. Blokland & Paul
Nieuwbeerta, The Effects of Life Circumstances on Longitudinal Trajectories of Offending,
43 CRIMINOLOGY 1203 (2005) (using this method to describe the latent propensity to offend
over the entire life course, roughly age twelve to age seventy).
33 See, e.g., Blokland et al., supra note , at 932-33; Bushway et al., supra note, at 141-
45.
34 David P. Farrington et al., Criminal Careers Up to Age 50 and Life Success Up to Age
48: New Findings from the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development (Home Off.,
Development & Statistics Directorate Res. Study No. 299, 2d ed. 2006), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/hors299.pdf.
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differences, or period-to-period change. But the study of desistance is
fundamentally not about period-to-period change unless one is willing to
conclude that long-term change in offending is essentially random, a
process that time-series statisticians call a random walk.35 An alternative is
to explain the long-term change using structural breaks. We will argue that
identity theory, as we describe it, is essentially a story of structural breaks.
Support for our theory can, therefore, be developed by examining a time
series of offending at the individual level for structural breaks. The timing
and predictability of the structural breaks will help establish the viability of
identity theory.36
II. AN IDENTITY THEORY OF DESISTANCE FROM CRIME
A. IDENTITY THEORY: THE WORKING SELF AND THE POSSIBLE SELF
There is a long intellectual tradition in sociology and social
psychology that emphasizes the importance of one's identity. 37 Identity-a
sense of who one is-is important for numerous reasons, the most
important of which, at least for our concerns, is that it motivates and
provides a direction for behavior.38  A person's actions are seen as
expressions of his self-identity-people intentionally behave in ways that
are consistent with who they think we are. When interacting with others,
therefore, people project an identity of who they are, and a primary vehicle
for communicating to others who "one is" is through one's behavior.
39
35 RICHARD MCCLEARY & RICHARD A. HAY, JR., APPLIED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES (1980).
36 We will also argue that support for the theory can also be developed by a more
traditional research strategy, such as conducting intensive interviews with samples of
committed criminal offenders some of whom are going through, or have gone through, the
desistance process. Information obtained from such offenders would include data about the
process described in this paper: change in identity, crystallization of discontent, and changes
in social and institutional relationships.
37 See generally CHARLES H. COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1902);
WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890); GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF,
AND SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (1934); SHELDON STRYKER,
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: A SOCIAL STRUCTURAL VERSION (1980); Sheldon Stryker,
Identity Salience and Role Performance: The Relevance of Symbolic Interaction Theory for
Family Research, 4 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 558 (1968).
38 See, e.g., Peter J. Burke, The Self- Measurement Requirements from an Interactionist
Perspective, 43 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 18 (1980); Peter J. Burke & Donald C. Reitzes, The Link
Between Identity and Role Performance, 44 SoC. PSYCHOL. Q. 83 (1981); Nelson N. Foote,
Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation, 16 AM. SOC. REV. 14 (1951); Stryker,
supra note.
39 It is in this sense that Stryker claimed that "[a]ctors within this social structure name
themselves as well-it is to these reflexively applied positional designations that the concept
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Peter Burke and Donald Reitzes further argue that persons make
commitments to their identity. It is the fact that commitments are made to
identities that "certain lines of action are valued," and it is this commitment
to an identity that explains why behavior is motivated and generally
consistent in different situations.40  This, of course, does not mean that
identity determines behavior since the self is very reflexive and
interpretative. It does, however, mean that the self, which guides action
toward some purposeful goal, being both very dynamic and reflective, is
capable of change. It is this notion of the self as an active subject
intentionally pursuing lines of activity that makes human beings agents.41
Although, at its most basic level, one's identity can be understood as
an attempt to answer the question, "Who am I?", individuals do not have
just one identity. Most people have multiple views about themselves and
therefore multiple identities that are organized into a salience hierarchy.42
Some identities are, therefore, more important and more prominent than
others and, thus, more consistently seen in behavior. This view of the self
as having a multifaceted structure implies that there is not something like
the self, but a collection or set of selves.43 Identities or selves also vary in
terms of their temporal orientation. Some selves, like the working self, are
oriented toward the present while others, like the possible self, are oriented
toward the future.4
The working self is that component of the self that can be accessed at
45the moment and is based upon the individual's here-and-now experience.
Anchored in the present from one's existing pool of experiences and self-
knowledge, the working self consists of what the self is in the present. This
notion of the working self does not mean that identity is fleeting or
inconsistent over time and place even in the present because there can be
of self is typically intended to refer-and in so doing they create internalized expectations
with respect to their own behavior." Stryker, supra note , at 559.
40 Peter J. Burke & Donald C. Reitzes, An Identity Theory Approach to Commitment, 54
Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 239, 240 (1991).
41 ARCHER, BEING HUMAN, supra note ; ARCHER, MAKING OUR WAY, supra note ; Alicia
D. Cast, Identities and Behavior, in ADVANCES IN IDENTITY THEORY AND RESEARCH 41
(Peter J. Burke et al. eds., 2003); Burke & Reitzes, supra note ; Burke & Reitzes, supra note
42 Stryker, supra note ; see also Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and
Future of an Identity Theory, 63 SoC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284 (2000).
43 Hazel Markus, Self-Knowledge: An Expanded View, 51 J. PERSONALITY 543 (1983);
Hazel Markus & Elissa Wurf, The Dynamic Self-Concept: A Social Psychological
Perspective, 38 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 299 (1987).
44 Markus, supra note ; Markus & Wurf, supra note.
45 Hazel Markus & Ziva Kunda, Stability and Malleability of the Self-Concept, 51 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 858 (1986); Markus & Wurf, supra note.
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more central or core aspects of one's self that are "chronically accessible. 46
One can, for instance, have, as part of his working self, the notion that he is
a drug dealer, a father concerned about his child, a drug user, a person with
limited education and legitimate job possibilities, an indifferent but
demanding lover, one with an expensive taste in liquor, and a loyal crime
partner. Not all of these components of self-knowledge will be accessed or
relevant at all times, but, relatively speaking, others will be more core
components of one's self, or part of one's self-schema.47
In addition to a sense of who and what one is at the moment (a self that
is fixed on the present), an individual also has a sense of self that is directed
toward the future. This future-oriented self can be defined positively as the
self one would like to become or negatively as the self one would not want
to become or fear that one might become. Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius
have defined both dimensions of this future orientation of the self as a
possible self.48 The possible selves "are conceptions of the self in future
states" and consist of goals and aspirations as well as anxieties and fears
that the individual has as to what they could become.49 While our working
selves are aware of what skills we do and do not have and what we can and
cannot do in the present, our possible selves are directed toward the future
and what it is possible for us to be, good or ill. As a conception of the self
in a future state, the possible self is not mere fantasy but is connected to
current selves and past experiences and is directed at individually specific
hopes or goals and fears or uncertainties.
I may, for example, see myself currently (my working self) as an
unskilled thief who is addicted to drugs, but may see myself in the future as
working in a job (though perhaps for minimum wage), being a better parent
and partner, owning a car, and ceasing my life of drug use and crime. I
may, however, also fear that I may turn out to be a burned-out addict,
riddled with disease, homeless, childless, jobless, and destined to die alone
in prison. My possible self is, of course, constrained by the context within
which it exists in the sense that my hopes and goals are limited by my social
46 E. Tory Higgins, Gillian A. King & Gregory H. Mavin, Individual Construct
Accessibility and Subjective Impressions and Recall, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
35-38 (1982).
47 Hazel Markus, Self-Schemata and Processing Information About the Self, 35 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 63 (1977).
48 Markus & Nurius, Interface, supra note ; Markus & Nurius, Possible Selves, supra
note . Along similar lines, Schlenker speaks of a "desired self." A desired self is "what the
person would like to be and thinks he or she can really be." Barry R. Schlenker, Identity and
Self-Identification, in THE SELF AND SOCIAL LIFE 65, 74 (Barry R. Schlenker ed., 1985). A
desired self, then, emphasizes a positive identity that a person would like to have and is
realistic to have.
49 Markus & Nurius, Interface, supra note, at 157.
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environment (given my education and my criminal record, my positive
possible self would not likely include being a doctor or the driver of a
Jaguar). An individual's actions must coordinate or balance the
individual's goals, aspirations, and fears with what is possible or feasible
within the social environment. Behavior, then, is not driven solely by
human agency but is influenced by the social and cultural environments
within which action takes place.50
At least two consequences of possible selves are important for our
concerns. One is that when a person imagines a positive possible self
achieved or a negative possible self avoided, his feeling about his self is
enhanced.51 If I think about the positive possible me who is able to hold
down a good factory job and the one who has successfully avoided falling
back into crime and drug addiction, my esteem is inevitably enhanced. I
may not be these things today-my working self does not include the view
that I am a wage-earning factory worker or non-offender-but I envision
my future self as containing these possible identities. The self-enhancing
consequences of a positive possible self are an important reminder that
change is possible because the self is not immutable. The self-enhancing
component of a possible self fuels optimism and provides hope that
whatever one's situation is today, the possibility of a better future exists.
Similarly, a negative possible self may be a stark reminder that however
bad things currently are, they can get worse-and the image of what is
"worse" is squarely in one's consciousness. Self-enhancing possible selves,
therefore, contribute to positive and optimistic as well as self-defeating and
hopeless feelings about the self, but they are not directly relevant for the
person's future behavior.
The second consequence of a possible self is that it provides directed
motivation for one's behavior. 3  Possible selves, both positive and
negative, not only contain images of what the person would like to be or
desperately fears becoming, they can also provide a specific and realistic set
of instructions or a "roadmap" directing what one can do to both achieve
50 ARCHER, BEING HUMAN, supra note ; Mustafa Emirbayer & Jeff Goodwin, Network
Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency, 99 AM. J. Soc. 1411 (1994); Mustafa
Emirbayer & Ann Mische, What Is Agency?, 103 AM. J. SOc. 962 (1998).
51 RICK H. HOYLE ET AL., SELFHOOD: IDENTITY, ESTEEM AND REGULATION (John Harvey
ed., 1999); Laura A. King, The Health Benefits of Writing About Life Goals, 27
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 798-800 (2001).
52 King, supra note , at 798-99; see also Marti Hope Gonzales et al., The Allure of Bad
Plans: Implications of Plan Quality for Progress Toward Possible Selves and Post-Planning
Energization, 23 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 87 (2001).
53 Markus & Nurius, Possible Selves, supra note , at 955; Markus & Nurius, Interface,
supra note , at 159-60.
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the positive future self and avoid the negative possible self.54 This roadmap
or blueprint is referred to as the self-regulating component of the possible
self.55  The self is self-regulating because, among other things, it (1)
compares the past and current working-self with the possible self and
provides specific directions, strategies, or plans for narrowing any
discrepancy between the two for a positive possible self or (2) increases the
divergence with a feared self, thereby connecting the present with the
future. Motivation is generated and is more likely to be successful, then,
when one not only has a goal of self-improvement, but also has specific and
realistic means to both reach that goal and to avoid the kind of person one
does not want to become. In this sense, one component of the possible self
is that of providing a "blueprint" for self-change to lead one toward a
positive possible self and away from a feared self.56 Possible selves,
therefore, consist of both desired ends or goals and means or a sense of how
the goals can be realized. As Markus and Nurius state,
Possible selves encompass within their scope visions of desired and undesired end
states. Very often they also include some idea about the ways to achieve these ends
and thereby provide the means-ends patterns for new behaviour. Represented within
possible selves are the plans and strategies for approaching or avoiding personally
significant possibilities .... Thus, it is the possible self that puts the self into action,
that outlines the likely course of action. In sociological terms, possible selves are the
link between salient identities and role performance.
The difference between the self-enhancing and self-regulating
components of the possible self is that the latter provides directed or
focused motivation with respect to specific and realistic behavioral
strategies for goal attainment, while the former does not. Peggy Giordano,
Stephen Cemkovich, and Jennifer Rudolph provide an example from the
desistance literature.58 One of their subjects, Nicole, was a homeless crack
addict with several children and a bleak past but a specific and realistic
sense of her future self:
I see me gettin' a house and a job, by the time this year is out I've set goals to have a
job and be off of welfare. My plan is to get into a house when school starts in
September to start going to school to be a nurses' assistant.
5 9
54 Rick H. Hoyle & Michelle R. Sherrill, Future Orientation in the Self-System: Possible
Selves, Self-Regulation, and Behavior, 74 J. PERSONALITY 1673, 1675-76 (2006); Daphna
Oyserman et al., Possible Selves as Roadmaps, 38 J. RES. PERSONALITY 130, 132 (2004).
55 Oyserman et al., supra note.
56 Id.
57 Markus & Nurius, supra note, at 159.
58 Giordano et al., Gender, Crime and Desistance, supra note.
" Id. at 1026.
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Nicole has a very specific plan to be off of welfare and have a home for her
children when they start school, and, in aspiring to be a nurse's aide rather
than a nurse, her plan is realistic. This realistic blueprint of how to avoid
being what one fears and how to change one's self to be more like the
positive possible self may be an important component of the optimism or
self-efficacy that offenders who eventually desist seem to possess.6° It also
highlights the importance of the blueprint or specific road map to the
possible self. Many, if not most, offenders may "talk the talk" about
wanting to reform and be a different kind of person (a positive possible
self), but only some will have a specific and realistic strategy to make this
happen.
A feared possible self can also be a powerful motivator for change and
an outcome that one can intentionally try to avoid. In fact, for reasons that
will become clear later in this Article, movement out of a deviant or
"spoiled identity" is more likely, at least initially, to be based on a sense of
what one does not want to become rather than a sense of what one wants to
become. Norman Denzin has argued that a powerful motivator for an
individual who desists from drinking occurs when "she comes to define
herself in terms of who she no longer wants to be.' Patrick Biernacki has
observed similar trends with respect to former opiate addicts:
When illicit addicts begin to question their lives and resolve to stop using opiates,
their change in perspective often is negative in the sense that they see the continued
use of opiates, and their involvement with other addicts and the world of addiction,
only as undesirable, or worse, as actually or potentially detrimental to their wellbeing.
The change in perspective does not necessarily entail a positive view that could
provide an alternative to their present situation. At this point, addicts ma know what
they do not want to do, but they are less certain about what they do want.
Denzin's characterization of the alcoholic and Biernacki's description
of the drug addict seem equally true for offenders exiting the role of
criminal. At the point that they begin to think about "going straight,"
offenders may have only an inchoate sense of what kind of conventional life
they want but a very vivid and profound image of what kind of future they
63
now realize they do not want. This notion of starkly fearing how one's
life may turn out as a motivation for quitting crime can be seen in a number
60 MARUNA, supra note , at 95-99; Ros Bumett & Shadd Maruna, So 'Prison Works'
Does It?: The Criminal Careers of 130 Men Released from Prison Under Home Secretary,
Michael Howard, 43 How. J. CRIM. JUST. 394-99 (2004).
61 NORMAN K. DENZIN, THE RECOVERING ALCOHOLIC 158 (1987).
62 PATRICK BIERNACKI, PATHWAYS FROM HEROIN ADDICTION: RECOVERY WITHOUT
TREATMENT 72 (Sheryl Ruzek & Irving Kenneth Zola eds., 1986) (emphasis added).
63 Id.
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of ethnographic accounts.64 Deborah Baskin and Ira Sommers provide the
following account of a female, drug-involved offender:
You get tired of bein' tired, you know. I got tired of hustlin', you know. I got tired of
livin' the way I was livin', you know. Due to your body, your body, mentally
emotionally, you know. Everybody's tryin' to get over. Everybody will stab you in
your back. Nobody gives a fluck about the next person. And I used to have people
talkin' to me, "You know, you're not a bad lookin' girl. You know, why you don't
get yourself together?" 
65
The role of a feared self can be seen in the words of a recovering heroin
addict and street criminal in Biemacki's study who recounted the fear of
becoming a prostitute as a factor in quitting drugs: "I was real scared, real
frightened, real terrified... of what would happen to me. I felt like I was at
a point where either I had to clean up or become a dealer or
prostitute ....,,66
Another one of Baskin and Sommers's desisting female offenders
reveals another important dimension of the feared self-that offenders
realize that they have isolated themselves from their conventional pasts:
The fact that my family didn't trust me anymore, and the way that my daughter was
looking at me, and, uh, my mother wouldn't let me in her house anymore, and I was
sleepin' on the trains. And I was sleepin' on the beaches in the summertime. And I
was really frightened. I was real scared of the fact that I had to sleep on the train.
And, uh, I had to wash up in the Port Authority. I was alone and no one was helping
me anymore. I used to have my family when things got real rough. I always thought I
would eventually have my daughter. But I was all of sudden, all alone.
67
This notion of personal isolation from their connection to any pro-social life
is a recurrent theme in ex-offenders' descriptions of their lives. This
woman's story reveals how embedded in their criminal lives offenders can
become and how, because of this criminal embeddedness, it is difficult to
gain access to legitimate opportunities, such as jobs or conventional social
networks, without at least some indication on their part that they have
started to turn their lives around or are not who they used to be.68
64 See, e.g., DEBORAH R. BASKIN & IRA B SOMMERS, CASUALTIES OF COMMUNITY
DISORDER: WOMEN'S CAREERS IN VIOLENT CRIME 129-31 (John Hagan ed., 1998).
65 Id. at 129. We would like to make it absolutely clear that our use of others' qualitative
data is strictly limited to the purpose of illustrating a point about the theory, and that such
qualitative data is silent with respect to the validity of the theory. None of the qualitative
data we use provides evidence or support for the theory. The validation of our theoretical
argument awaits independent empirical research-two frameworks for which we suggest
later in the paper.
66 BIERNACKI, supra note , at 53.
67 BASKIN & SOMMERS, supra note, at 130.
68 See, e.g., JOHN HAGAN & BILL MCCARTHY, MEAN STREETS: YOUTH CRIME AND
HOMELESSNESS (Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 1997); John Hagan, The Social
Embeddedness of Crime and Unemployment, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 465 (1993); John Hagan,
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Our suggestion that the "feared self," the negative possible self, may
be a particularly powerful motivator for those leaving crime is consistent
with the clinical literature concerning alcoholics and drug addicts,
suggesting that:
"[N]egative" or "avoidant" motives such as fear of arrest, physical deterioration,
family breakup or job loss characterize initial reasons for not drinking which are later
eclipsed by more positive or "approach" motives such as a sense of purpose in life, a
commitment to financial or occupational success, focus on closeness and intimacy in
relationships, or the development of creative or altruistic goals.
69
The feared self is likely to be one such "avoidant motive" that initiates self-
change only to be supplemented over time with a more positive possible
self-the conventional self one wants to become.
70
Those desiring to break from crime, then, are likely motivated at first
by a strong aversion to the negative possible self, the feared self that they
do not want to become. Aversion to the feared self alone cannot sustain the
break with crime, but it does supply the initial motivation, which, over time,
is supplemented by more positive reasons. In fact, although notions of the
feared self may dominate at first, success at self-change seems in the long-
run to require a balance between positive and negative possible selves-a
combination of both what one wants to become and moves toward and what
one fears that one will become and moves away from.7 ' In the words of one
adolescent at high risk of delinquency, Daphna Oyserman and Hazel
Markus provide an example of both a self-regulating possible self and a
balance between what one wants to be and what one fears they might be in
possible selves:
I expect to be doing better in school, to be almost independent-ready to move out
and to have a part-time job. I hope to study more, have a good paying part-time job,
Destiny and Drift: Subcultural Preferences, Status Attainments, and the Risks and Rewards
of Youth, 56 AM. Soc. REv. 567 (1991).
69 Maryann Amodeo et al., Abstinence, Reasons for Not Drinking, and Life Satisfaction,
27 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 707, 708-09 (1992); see also MARUNA, supra note ; Helen Matzger
et al., Reasons for Drinking Less and Their Relationship to Sustained Remission from
Problem Drinking, 100 ADDICTION 1637 (2005); George E. Valliant & Eva S. Milofsky, The
Etiology ofAlcoholism: A Prospective Viewpoint, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 494 (1982); Connie
Weisner, The Role of Alcohol-Related Problematic Events in Treatment Entry, 26 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 93 (1990); William F. White & Thomas. L. Porter, Self Concept
Reports Among Hospitalized Alcoholics During Early Periods of Sobriety, 13 J. COUNSELING
PSYCHOL. 352 (1966).
70 This theme was also developed in MARUNA, supra note, at 27.
71 Hoyle & Sherrill, supra note , at 1677-78; Daphna Oyserman & Hazel Rose Markus,
Possible Selves and Delinquency, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 112, 113 (1990).
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and be independent of my parents. I'm afraid I might not stay in school, I won't get a
summer job, and I'll be homeless.
72
A possible self balanced between what is hoped for and what is feared
is thought to be more effective in reaching one's ultimate goal because the
consequent motivation is additive, combining both an approach and an
avoidance mechanism. Oyserman and Markus have argued that a positive
or hoped-for possible self may be insufficient by itself to keep those
desiring self-improvement from staying on course. This is particularly true
in the face of difficulties and setbacks when persons are moving from a
compelling or appealing current self (a delinquent) to one that is not
intuitively as compelling (a good student and part-time, low-wage
worker).73 Just as the motivation to move away from a self that is feared is
both enhanced and directed by the motivation to move toward the hoped-for
self, the motivation to move toward a desired self is strengthened by the
image of the feared-about self that is incompatible with it.
The other reason we think aversion to the feared self provides the
initial motivation to begin the break with crime is that, as we will argue in
some detail below, the events that lead up to the decision to leave crime are
primarily negative; in fact, a gradual accumulation and connection of
diverse negative events tends to occur. That is, we think that offenders do
not initially think about leaving crime because they suddenly see the
advantages of a conventional life, but rather because they begin to see, in
more vivid detail than ever, the costs and disadvantages of their lives of
crime. It is this growing awareness of the accumulating costs of crime and
that such costs are linked both to one's self and one's future, that provides
offenders with the clarity they need to begin thinking about leaving crime
and the motivation to engage in intentional self-change. We would hasten
to add, however, that both the awareness of the accumulating costs of crime
and the realization that one must change who and what one is in order to
avoid this future is very gradual, and likely not the sudden "epiphany" that
Denzin describes in his discussion of those trying to desist from drinking.74
This notion of an evolving awareness of the costs of crime and the attendant
awareness that such costs are projected into the future supports our view
that desistance is a process and not a moment or an event.
75
72 Oyserman & Markus, supra note, at 117.
71 Id. at 114.
74 NORMAN K. DENZIN, INTERPRETIVE INTERACTIONISM 74-75 (Leonard Bickman & Debra
Rog eds., 1989).
75 In this regard, we agree with Bottoms et al.'s assessment of desistance: "Damascene
conversions may happen for a few, but we suspect that, for many people, the progression is
faltering, hesitant and oscillating." Anthony Bottoms et al., Towards Desistance:
Theoretical Underpinnings for an Empirical Study, 43 How J. CRIM. JUST. 368, 383 (2004).
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As we have discussed, the link between the working self and the
possible self is that one maintains a commitment to the working self unless
and until that identity and the commitment that is attached to it are
undermined or are perceived to be unsatisfying or unsuccessful. In other
words, commitment to a working self continues so long as it is perceived to
be a source of satisfaction or reward. Burke and Reitzes have noted that
there are two bases of identity commitment: (1) a cognitive basis that refers
to the "overall reward-cost balance of maintaining the identity"; and (2) a
socio-emotional basis that refers to the emotional ties created with others
based upon the identity.76 In the first instance one can be committed to an
identity as a criminal offender because that identity nets one money, drugs,
or other desirable things with less cost than an alternative, conventional
identity." In the second instance, one is committed to an identity because
of the satisfying relationships forged as a result of interacting with others on
the basis of that identity.78
Though stable, identities clearly can and do change. We are arguing
that a working identity as a criminal offender can change into a more
conventional identity when the person thinks of a conventional identity as a
positive possible self and an identity of a burned out ex-con with no friends
or possessions as a negative possible self. Contemplation of a possible self
that does not include criminal offending in turn occurs when the working
identity of criminal is perceived to be problematic or disappointing. An
identity of one's self as a criminal is likely to be a "core" component of
one's working identity and, as such, is frequently activated or easily
accessed and is less malleable than less important components. Just as a
criminal identity emerges slowly and tentatively in response to perceived
successes, so does a break from that identity. As one begins to find less
success and satisfaction with the criminal identity, one is likely to conjure
up negative possible selves: long terms in prison with young, violence-
prone fellow inmates; the possibility of a violent death; or small payoffs
from criminal enterprises. These negative possible selves and the eventual
activation of positive selves-a working person, a good spouse, a giving
father, a law abider--can provide both the motivation and direction for
change. Before one is willing to give up his working identity as a
lawbreaker, one must begin to perceive this identity as unsatisfying, thus
weakening one's commitment to it. Although this is an issue that should be
investigated by empirical research, we tend to doubt that this weakening of
one's commitment to a criminal identity comes about quickly. Nor do we
76 Burke & Reitzes, supra note , at 244.
77 Id.
78 id.
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think it comes about in response to one or two failures. Rather, it is likely
that one's commitment to an existing identity comes about only gradually
and subsequent to the linking of many failures and the attribution of those
linked failures to one's identity and life as a criminal.
B. LINKING FAILURE: THE CRYSTALIZATION OF DISCONTENT
What would motivate a past and current criminal offender to begin to
think of an identity and life without crime? It seems likely that current
offenders would only begin to think of a possible self that is conventional
and crime-free when they realize that the costs of crime and a criminal
identity are beginning to become too great and that being conventional
might provide either greater satisfaction or at least a lower price. This view
is faithful both to our view that criminal behavior and its abandonment are
rational behaviors and our belief that, though constrained by sometimes
severe structural factors, criminal offenders act with agency.
On its face, it might seem that one's commitment to a criminal identity
would be easy to surrender. What we know about criminal offending is that
it comes with great risk and little financial or personal gain.79 Crime is
above all else physically dangerous: after breaking into a house one can find
oneself confronted by an armed homeowner; drug dealers are shot and
robbed by both customers and competitors; drug buyers frequently receive
adulterated goods; and assaulters can at times be overmatched by stronger
(or more numerous or better armed) victims. Property crimes generally do
not net much in the way of money, and certainly not the kind of money with
which one can easily support oneself or a family. 80 Robberies generally
result in a paltry amount of cash, burglars do not get anywhere near top
dollar when they fence their stolen goods, carjackers who try to sell their
cars do not get "blue book" value, and drug sales for most participants
involve little more than petty cash.8' In addition, crime is "seasonal work."
79 Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling
Gang's Finances, 115 Q. J. ECON. 755, 757-58 (2000) [hereinafter Levitt & Venkatesh,
Economic Analysis]; see also JARED BERNSTEIN & ELLEN HOUSTON, CRIME AND WORK:
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET (2000); HAGAN & MCCARTHY,
supra note ; FELIX M. PADILLA, THE GANG AS AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE (1992); MERCER L.
SULLIVAN, "GETTING PAID": YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY (Roger Sanjec ed.,
1990); Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, Growing Up in the Projects: The
Economic Lives of a Cohort of Men Who Came of Age in Chicago Public Housing, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 79 (2001) [hereinafter Levitt & Venkatesh, Growing Up in the Projects].
80 GOTrFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note, at 18-21.
81 STEVEN D. LEvITr & STEPHEN J. BUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (lst ed. 2005); ABOUT CRIMINALS: A VIEW OF
THE OFFENDERS' WORLD (Mark Pogrebin ed., 2004); DARRELL J. STEFFENSMEIER, THE
FENCE: IN THE SHADOW OF TWO WORLDS (1986).
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Rarely is there steady employment with a paycheck that one can count on,
and the benefits are non-existent-no paid vacation time, no medical
coverage, and the retirement plan is not particularly attractive. Finally,
there are the high social costs of crime as well. Maintaining relationships
with family, partners, and children is extremely difficult if one is trying to
make it as a criminal, even if those relations themselves are on the dark
side. Family members are likely to be both an offender's victims as well as
victimizers, partners may stray (or be believed to) during periods of
incarceration, and children may turn against the offender and turn him in. 2
It would seem, therefore, that maintaining commitment to a criminal
identity would be very difficult and relinquishing it very easy, since by
many measures it appears to be a very Hobbesian life-an existence that is
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short., 83
A commitment to a criminal identity and criminal life becomes more
understandable, however, when viewed in the context of the stock of
conventional alternatives available to many criminal offenders.84 While a
criminal identity may not come with great financial payoff, for someone
with little education, few marketable job skills, and an arrest record it
cannot be much less attractive than minimum wage, the prospect of
repeated layoffs, long working hours, minimal benefits, and sometimes
dangerous and physically demanding working conditions. Further, criminal
offenders' prospects for adequate jobs become even bleaker with drug
addiction, arrest, conviction, and incarceration. While clearly not
financially lucrative, and often dangerous and lonely, a criminal identity
and life comes with its own incentives-excitement and thrills,
unencumbered relationships, and a sense of power or dominance-and may,
therefore, be seen as an attractive alternative to a conventional life.85 In
addition, just as there is an element of idealism in legitimate professions
that provides motivation to persevere in the course of one's inevitable
occupational ordeals and trials, there is likely an element of idealism among
those selecting a life of crime.86 Those involved in theft, for example,
82 Nancy Wolff, Jing Shi & Jane A. Siegel, Patterns of Victimization Among Male and
Female Inmates: Evidence of an Enduring Legacy, in 24 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 469, 469-84
(2009).
83 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Touchstone 1997) (1651).
84 BERNSTEIN & HOUSTON, supra note ; SULLIVAN, supra note ; SUDHIR VENKATESH,
GANG LEADER FOR A DAY (2008); SUDHIR VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND
ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR (2006); Levitt & Venkatesh, supra note.
85 JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 52-79 (1988).
86 See generally ANTHONY GARY DWORK1N, TEACHER BURNOUT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
STRUCTURAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR CHILDREN (Daniel Duke ed., 1986); SEYMOUR
B. SARASON, WORK, AGING, AND SOCIAL CHANGE: PROFESSIONALS AND THE ONE LIFE-ONE
CAREER IMPERATIVE (1977).
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frequently have high hopes for the "big score," a life of thrills,87 or at least a
life that moves between crime and "life as party., 88 While such
"professional" idealism is important while one is learning a vocation and in
providing motivation in difficult times, the ideals are unlikely to be
realized, and one will be repeatedly confronted with the reality of
frustration and failure. The reality of the criminal life is that it is
destructive for healthy social relationships, its economic benefits are
meager, and dangers are ever present. While useful at times, idealism
allows for "burnout" and the desire for change in one's "profession" and
professional identity.89
Whatever the advantages a conventional, non-criminal possible self in
the future does offer, in order for someone with a current or working
identity as a criminal offender to begin to consider it, the attachment to the
current identity must be weakened. We believe that the weakening of a
criminal identity comes about gradually and as a result of a growing sense
of dissatisfaction with crime.90 This dissatisfaction with crime is more
likely to lead to a conventional possible self when failures or
dissatisfactions across many aspects of one's life are linked together and
attributed to the criminal identity itself. It is not just that one has
experienced failures but that diverse kinds of failures in one's life become
interconnected as part of a coherent whole. This coherence leads the person
to feel a more general kind of life dissatisfaction, the kind of life
dissatisfaction that can lead to identity change, or what K. Jill Kiecolt has
rightly termed "intentional self-change."
9
'
Roy Baumeister has referred to the linking of previously isolated
dissatisfactions and senses of failure in life as the "crystallization of
87 KATZ, supra note, at 65-66, 299-300.
88 SHOVER, supra note, at 93-109.
89 DWORKIN, supra note, at 21-34.
90 This is consistent with Neal Shover and Carol Thompson, who found that the
probability of desistance increases when offenders' expectations for achieving rewards
through criminal activity declines. Neal Shover & Carol Y. Thompson, Age, Differential
Expectations, and Crime Desistance, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1992). Similarly, Sommers et al.
speak about "socially disjunctive experiences" as catalysts for decisions to quit offending.
Ira Sommers, Deborah R. Baskin & Jeffrey Fagan, Getting out of the Life: Crime Desistance
by Female Street Offenders, 15 DEVIANT BEHAV. 125 (1994). Lee Robins noted that for the
offenders she studied "the most frequent explanation offered for desistance was that "I just
wasn't up to that kind of hassle anymore." Lee N. Robins, Explaining When Arrests End for
Serious Juvenile Offenders: Comments on the Sampson and Laub Study, 602 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sc. 61 (2005).
91 K. Jill Kiecolt, Stress and the Decision to Change Oneself: A Theoretical Model, 57
Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 49-51 (1994).
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discontent. ,92 This crystallization of discontent, part of a subjective
process of self-interpretation or self-knowledge, is
understood as the forming of associative links among a multitude of unpleasant,
unsatisfactory, and otherwise negative features of one's current life situation. Prior to
a crystallization of discontent, a person may have many complaints and misgivings
about some role, relationship, or involvement, but these remain separate from each
other. The crystallization brings them together into a coherent body of complaints and
misgivings.... The subjective impact can be enormous, because a large mass of
negative features may be enough to undermine a person's commitment to a role,
relationship, or involvement, whereas when there are many individual and seemingly
unrelated complaints that arise one at a time, no one of them is sufficient to undermine
that commitment.
93
While no one single complaint or dissatisfaction may be enough to motivate
someone to question his life, the linking together of numerous previously
isolated complaints may be sufficiently strong to undermine a person's
commitment to a role or identity.
When understood as single unrelated events, failures, complaints, or
misgivings can more easily be dismissed as simply isolated difficulties to be
expected and ignored as part of ordinary life. As long as the significance of
isolated failures can be ignored, and be seen as separate and isolated, they
are not likely to entice the person to make major life considerations or re-
evaluations and do not lead to a weakening of commitment to an identity.
Once linked, however, these failures become part of a pattern that might
not easily be fixed, be ignored, or disappear, requiring a reevaluation or
reassessment of one's current situation.
The crystallization of discontent prompts a reassessment of the relationship or
commitment. Isolated problems, frustrations, and bad days can be ignored as low-
level setbacks that do not reflect negatively on one's overall level of satisfaction and
commitment. But a large pattern of problems and frustrations brings one up to a
broader level of meaning and raises the issue of whether the positives outweigh the
negatives. The person's calculation of whether the involvement is worthwhile can no
longer ignore the large body of problems.
94
Once problems and dissatisfactions have been connected into a larger
whole, and one realizes that these problems will not go away and can no
longer be ignored, one's commitment to an existing life and existing
identity is more easily called into question.
92 See Roy F. BAUMEISTER, MEANINGS OF LIFE 303-06 (1991); Roy F. Baumeister, The
Crystallization of Discontent, in CAN PERSONALITY CHANGE? 281, 281-82 (Todd F.
Heatherton & Joel L. Weinberger eds., 1994).
93 Baumeister, supra note, at 281-82.
9' BAUMEISTER, supra note, at 306.
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Biernacki describes the events leading up to an opiate addict's decision
to finally give up drugs as based upon an accumulation of minor discontents
that get linked:
The generally chaotic state of the addict condition often results in addicts' thinking
about altering their lives and stopping their use of opiates .... For some addicts, the
personal experiences that stimulate the resolve seem to be rather trivial events-for
example, purchasing poor-quality heroin ("bunk") and not being able to get high. Yet,
to the addict these events may not be trivial at all; added to the other problems the
addict must deal with, they are perceived as being "the last straw."
95
Similarly, with respect to more general kinds of role and identity changes,
Helen Ebaugh speaks of the importance of a "gradual build-up of feelings
[that] ... were the culmination of a long process of doubting and evaluating
alternatives., 96  She also noted that even when there appeared to be a
specific triggering event in someone's life that led him to exit a role and
identity, the event itself frequently was trivial but took on added importance
because it "symbolized the culmination of feelings and role ambivalence." 97
The triggering event in the life of a criminal offender-arrest, incarceration,
being surprised and shot at during a burglary-may initiate a
reconsideration of one's commitment to a criminal identity not because of
what it stands for alone, but because it may focus one's feelings on a more
general discontent and life dissatisfaction. The kind of general
dissatisfaction with one's life of crime that a crystallization of discontent
can bring is illustrated in the following words of a former burglar:
The impetus to think seriously about [desistance]... seemed to come in many cases
from a gradual disenchantment with the criminal life in its totality: the inability to
trust people; the frequent harassment by the police; the effects on wives and children
when the offender is in prison...98
Commitments to criminal identities are maintained in part because of the
ability to keep one's failures isolated and unconnected while keeping one's
successes interrelated and as typical outcomes. That is, I am able to keep
my criminal identity intact, in spite of the low financial reward, physical
risk, and turmoil with social relationships because I am successful in both
exaggerating the benefits and minimizing the costs. One way the benefits
can be maximized is by seeing them as inextricably connected to who I am
and as connected and tied to my identity; costs can be minimized by
viewing them as exceptional or unrelated to each other or not connected to
my identity. One's commitment to an identity becomes reevaluated when
95 BIERNACKI, supra note , at 54.
96 HELEN ROSE FUCHS EBAUGH, BECOMING AN Ex: THE PROCESS OF ROLE EXIT 128
(1988).
9' Id. at 125-28.
98 MIKE MAGUIRE & TREVOR BENNETT, BURGLARY IN A DWELLING 89 (1982).
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this changes-when one begins to see successes as isolated while seeing
failures as part of a whole-and discontent becomes crystallized. In order
for this questioning of commitment to identity to occur, there does not have
to be an increase in either the frequency or magnitude of one's failures or
dissatisfactions. Rather, what changes is how the sources of content and
discontent in one's life are perceived and evaluated. Dissatisfaction with a
few unpleasant outcomes becomes dissatisfaction with one's life and with
who one is.
It is this new understanding of who one wants to be that leads to the
effort to intentionally change; or, as Neal Shover put it, "This new
perspective symbolizes a watershed in [offenders'] lives. They decide that
their earlier identity and behavior are of limited value for constructing the
future." 99 The importance of the crystallization of discontent is that after it
occurs, the dissatisfactions that one has experienced now have implications
for the future. Events that seemed atypical and isolated are now seen as
interrelated and therefore both less easily dismissed and likely to continue
to occur in the future. The projection of continued life dissatisfaction into
the future leads the person to begin to seek changes. Unlike Maruna, who
argues that offenders do not change their identities as part of the process of
desisting from crime but simply reinterpret their past as somehow both
consistent with and as a necessary prelude to the prosocial person that they
think they are,' °° our view is that there is a distinct change in how offenders
think about "who they are." Because of the crystallization of discontent and
the accumulation of dissatisfactions, this change in identity is likely
motivated at first by "avoidant motives" of not becoming the feared self.
An offender moves tentatively (and perhaps inconsistently) toward being a
more conforming person, and that movement is assisted and made possible
by two other changes that are subsequent to a change in identity: changes in
preferences and changes in social networks. 10 1 Changes in preferences and
social networks that are brought about by changes in identity lead offenders
to consider and weigh things differently than they did in the past.
C. SUPPORTS FOR SELF-CHANGE: PREFERENCES AND SOCIAL
SUPPORTS
The process of thinking beyond a motivation to change one's self
toward actually making that happen occurs when there is a change in
preferences. A preference can be thought of as a taste or penchant for
99 Shover, supra note, at 132.
100 Maruna, supra note , at 85-108.
'0t See generally Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance, supra note ; Giordano
et al., Emotions and Crime, supra note.
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something. 0 2 An example of a preference would be what Giordano et al.
refer to when they speak of the "changes in the meaning and desirability of
deviant/criminal behavior itself" that bring about desistance. 10 3  For
example, one of their respondents, Donna, says that she used to think that
life was a big party and that taking drugs was fun and exciting. 10 4 In doing
so she is expressing a preference for drug using and "hard partying.
105
When another respondent reported that he once liked hanging around two
friends who were "wild ... and cool," he was expressing a preference.
10 6
Since preferences provide a source of and direction for motivation, they are
inextricably linked with a person's self-identity. 10 7 One way I can express
who and what I am is in terms of my tastes. 1 8 One with preferences or
tastes like those described above seems to be consistent with an identity as a
rule breaker, non-conformist, fun-lover, risk seeker, and one who seeks the
company of other non-conformists and fun-lovers.
Since preferences are linked to personal identities, an important change
attendant to a change in identity is a change in one's preferences. Though
initially guided by the feared self or "avoidant motives," offenders who feel
that "they just can't take the hassle" slowly begin to construct a new view
of who they would like to be.' 09 This change in identity is in part reflected
to the self and others as a change in preferences-offenders wishing to quit
crime develop tastes for non-criminal actions and the newly perceived
"comforts" of a non-criminal life. One of Shover's desisting thieves stated
just such a change in preference:
102 SARAH LICHTENSTEIN & PAUL SLOVIC, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 1-40
(2006).
103 Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance, supra note, at 992.
104 Giordano et al., Emotions and Crime, supra note, at 1625.
105 Id.
106 Peggy C. Giordano et al., Changes in Friendship Relations Over the Life Course:
Implications for Desistance from Crime, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 293, 308 (2003).
107 See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and identity, 115 Q. J. ECON.
715 (2000); Shane Frederick, Time Preference and Personal Identity, in TIME AND DECISION:
ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 89 (George
Loewenstein, Daniel Read & Roy F. Baumeister eds., 2003); George Loewenstein & Erik
Angner, Predicting and Indulging Changing Preferences, in TIME AND DECISION, supra, at
351.
108 Akerlof and Kranton provide as an example the giving of charitable contributions.
Akerlof & Kranton, supra note. Most people do not give to these charitable organizations,
which, with the highest marginal rate of return, would maximize the economic impact of the
gift. Rather, most give to organizations that reflect their identity-"green" organizations,
peace organizations, organizations for A.I.D.S. patients, the homeless, the Republican Party,
or their alma mater. Id.
109 Amodeo et al., supra note , at 709.
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I've got to a point where things that were important to me twelve, fifteen years ago
aren't important now. I used to have a lot of ambitions, like everybody else has-
different business ventures, stuff like that. But today, why, with what I have to buck
up against, why, I could be just as happy and just as satisfied with a job that I'm
getting by on, where I knew I wasn't going to run into trouble or anything.
110
Similarly, one of Monica Barry's young Scottish offenders who desisted
from crime stated, with respect to the nice clothes and money she had
received from her criminal activities, "I can do without things like that just
now.""' With a change in preferences, a minimum wage job, or one that
allows one to "just get by," might seem more acceptable than it used to. 112
An important component of a change in preference brought on by an
identity change, therefore, is the modification of views about the things that
are valuable, such as a marginal job or a stable relationship or family, and
the things that are costly, such as more prison time. A second important
change in preference that is related to desistance is a change in time
orientation. While cognitive psychologists, behavioral economists, and
criminologists have documented the fact that, as people age, they begin to
think more about long-term consequences,' 13 we argue here that part of
one's personal identity consists of how well one thinks one makes
decisions, considers the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action,
and shows patience; or, stated in the negative, how much one thinks of
oneself as "hot-headed" or impulsive.11 4 Research has shown that children
who exercised more patience and self-control in preschool were described
in late adolescence by their parents as more cognitively competent, and, as
adults, these children reported that they both seriously considered long-term
110 SHOVER, supra note, at 134.
"'MONICA BARRY, YOUTH OFFENDING IN TRANSITION: THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL
RECOGNITION 106 (2006).
112 Id
113 See SHOVER, supra note ; David M. Bishai, Does Time Preference Change with Age?,
17 J. POPULATION ECON. 583 (2004); Maurice Cusson & Pierre Pinsonneault, The Decision to
Give up Crime, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL 72 (Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke
eds., 1986); Leonard Green, Astrid F. Fry & Joel Myerson, Discounting of Delayed
Rewards: A Life-Span Comparison, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 33 (1994); Daniel Read & N. L. Read,
Time Discounting Over the Life Span, 94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAN. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 22 (2004); Neal Shover, The Later Stages of Ordinary Property Offender
Careers, 31 SOC. PROBS. 208 (1983).
114 See Frederick, supra note ; Loewenstein & Angner, supra note ; George Loewenstein
et al., Introduction to TIME AND DECISION, supra note , at 1. Descriptive of this is the
conclusion by Loewenstein, Read, and Baumeister that "[t]he ability to wait is not only
correlated with brain activity, but also with age and dispositional person variables ....
Independent of maturation level, stable individual differences also exist in the ability to
access cool-system strategies in dealing with the frustration of the delay situation." Id. at 5
(emphasis added).
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goals and deliberately planned for them." 5  Appraisals directed from
parents to their children about their competence and self-control are then
incorporated into the child's self-identity as a patient person who can resist
immediate temptations. 1 6  We imply here that certain types of people
(offenders, addicts, alcoholics, shopaholics) have self-control problems, are
aware of these self-control problems as part of their self-identity, and, in
becoming a different kind of person, can deliberately change the degree to
which they exercise patience and the quality of their decision making." 
7
One of the most critical changes in preference for the desisting
offender with a fledgling prosocial identity is in the kinds of friends she has
and the social networks in which she wishes to immerse herself. Kiecolt
has argued that intentional self-change is unlikely to be successful without
what she calls "structural supports" for change. 18 These supports "provide
individuals with means and opportunities for effecting self-change" and
include self-help groups and professional changers, such as psychiatrists
and social workers."19 As a separate condition for successful self-change,
Kiecolt includes the assistance of social supports such as friends, family
members, and spouses or partners.' 2 0  For the desisting offender with a
prosocial identity, structural supports or hooks for change consist of a
network of others more conventional than oneself.121 In fact, it is unlikely
that one can successfully desist from crime unless there is a successful
network realignment with more prosocial others. 122  But how does this
network realignment take place?
First of all, we believe that a social realignment is not generally
exogenous' 23 but that one deliberately and intentionally affiliates with more
prosocial others as part of the change in identity. That is, a change in
identity to a more prosocial person brings with it a preference for the kind
of people more likely to foster and support that new identity. This process
of network alignment (and the process of desistance itself) may be more or
less difficult to achieve. Dana Haynie has found that most people have
"mixed" peer networks-social networks comprised of both prosocial and
15 See, e.g., Yuichi Shoda et al., Predicting Adolescent Cognitive and Self-Regulatory
Competencies from Preschool Delay of Gratification: Identifying Diagnostic Conditions, 26
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 982-83 (1990).
116 Id. at 978-79.
117 Giordano et al., Emotions and Crime, supra note, at 1606-16.
118 Kiecolt, supra note, at 56. Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph call these supports
"hooks for change." Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, andDesistance, supra note , at 992.
119 Kiecolt, supra note , at 56.
120 Id.
121 Giordano et al., Emotions and Crime, supra note, at 1643-46.
122 Giordano et al., Changes in Friendship Relations, supra note, at 297-99.
123 See LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note.
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offending others. 124  To the extent that an offender's social network is
mixed, the process of realignment is easier; it may mean simply shifting
one's affiliations away from the antisocial members of the network and
toward the prosocial members and their conforming normative orientation
(giving credence to the so-called fact of desistance by geography or moving
away from the "bad guys"). The process of social network realignment
(and desisting from crime) may be much more difficult for those who are so
embedded in a criminal context that they have few or no prosocial others
from whom to draw support in breaking away from crime and may instead
have antisocial others who encourage them to stay on the path of crime.1
25
Recall the female offender in the Baskin and Sommers' study discussed
earlier who, after years of a life of drug use and crime, found herself so
embedded in crime that she felt completely isolated from the conventional
people in her life ("I was alone and no one was helping me anymore.").12 6
The importance of a change in one's social network was revealed in
the research of both Mark Warr' 27 and the team of Peggy Giordano, Stephen
Cemkovich, and Donna Holland.128 Warr reported that desistance from
offending is co-integrated with a decline in the importance of time spent
with peers to a greater involvement with one's spouse or partner.' 
9
Similarly, Giordano et al. found that those who were embedded in all-
offender peer networks were most likely to be involved in and continue in
crime, while those in mixed peer networks were more likely to desist.
30
Their narrative research also highlighted the fact that a social realignment
was likely induced by a change in preferences.13' Offenders who had new
prosocial identities and wanted to quit crime no longer had a preference for
friends who used drugs, did crime, or lived a "fast and crazy" life. 132 An
124 Dana L. Haynie, Friendship Networks and Adolescent Delinquency: The Relative
Nature of Peer Delinquency, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 99, 117 (2002).
125 See Hagan, Social Embeddedness, supra note, at 465-75.
126 BASKIN & SOMMERS, supra note, at 130.
127 See MARK WARR, COMPANIONS IN CRIME (2002); Mark Warr, Life-Course Transitions
and Desistance from Crime, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1998).
128 See Giordano et al., Changes in Friendship Relations, supra note.
129 WARR, supra note , at 103-04; Warr, supra note , at 188-96.
130 Giordano et al., Changes in Friendship Relations, supra note, at 312-16.
131 Id. at 316-17.
132 One of the offenders studied by Giordano et al., Debbie, commented: "I wanted to
settle down and stay out of trouble and they [her old friends] are still doing those things ....
I think they are still doing a lot of things that they still did back then. I don't want to do any
of that. Drinking, drugs, I just know where it got me...." Id. at 304. A male offender
stated: "Nobody told me, well Andy. . . or influenced me to break into this, this
building .... But it was just wanting to fit in. Just with some of the.., especially like
Chester and Shawn ... cause they were more, more wild. . . ." Id. at 308 (emphasis
omitted).
1130 [Vol. 99
DESISTANCE AND THE "FEARED SELF"
even more comprehensive understanding of this process can be found in
another line of research: the sociology of collective movements.
In his work on the sequences through which persons join and become
committed to high-risk social movements, like the 1964 Freedom Summer
Project in Mississippi,1 Doug McAdam argues that persons wanted and
deliberately sought to participate in Freedom Summer because the activities
and goals of the project reflected their personal identities.134  Those who
thought of themselves as social activists, liberals, reformers, civil rights
protectors, or good Christians were initially attracted to the Freedom
Summer Project and sought to volunteer. 135 In this sense, seeking to join
Freedom Summer was a deliberate act motivated by the fact that the
activities of the Project resonated with the personal identities of the
volunteers. An important factor that distinguished those who actually
participated in Freedom Summer and those who sought to but later backed
out was that the actual participants were better integrated into civil rights
organizations generally, had close friends who were also involved in the
project, and did not have close others, such as parents, to oppose their
joining. 136 Actual joiners were better integrated into social networks that
included others who were involved in the project and other civil rights
organizations. These networks could support and sustain their identities as
civil rights workers, activists, or liberals, and allowed them to be relatively
more isolated from others who opposed both their work for the Project and
their identity. Both their personal identities as civil rights activists and
being embedded in supportive social networks (while relatively isolated
133 The Mississippi Freedom Summer Project was initiated by the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee in 1964. The idea of the project was to recruit volunteers (most of
them white, well-off college students at elite universities) to work for three months in
Mississippi education and voter registration efforts. Workers for the projects lived in
communal houses or in the homes of local black families for the three months they were in
the state. The project was high-risk, because Mississippi was a tinderbox of racial tension at
the time and volunteers could expect opposition from local law enforcement and no
assistance or protection from federal authorities. The project was less than a half month old
when three workers-James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner-were
kidnapped by local whites, beaten to death, and buried in an earthen dam. One other
Freedom Summer Project volunteer lost his life and countless others experienced beatings,
arrests, and jailings.
134 See generally DOUG McADAM, FREEDOM SUMMER (1988); Debra Friedman & Doug
McAdam, Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices and the Life of a Social
Movement, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 156 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol
McClurg Mueller eds., 1992); Doug McAdam, Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case
of Freedom Summer, 92 Am. J. Soc. 64 (1986); Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen,
Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties andActivism, 99 AM. J. Soc. 640 (1993).
135 McAdam & Paulsen, supra note, at 642-45, 654-58.
136 Id. at 659.
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from oppositional social networks) separated the actual participants in
Freedom Summer from initially interested non-participants. 1
37
Another important point McAdam makes about those who join high-
risk collective movements is that the process is not sudden, but gradual and
made up of a series of successful minor steps.138 The fact that identity
transformation, preference shifts, and a change in social network affiliation
is a slow, gradual process is critical. The importance of this process for the
Freedom Summer Project was seen in the fact that before participating in
this high-risk effort, virtually all of those who volunteered had been
previously involved in less intense civil rights activities; some 90% of the
applicants had participated in write-in campaigns, signed petitions, or
engaged in protest demonstrations. 13 9 McAdam emphasizes that no one
immediately jumped into the Freedom Summer Project; rather, involvement
came about slowly, with incremental changes in identity followed by
tentative behavior that expressed that identity. 140 He argues that the process
of identity transformation involves
tentative forays into new roles that pave the way for more thoroughgoing identity
changes. Playing at being an 'activist' is a prerequisite to becoming one ....
Moreover, each succeeding foray into safe forms of activism increases the recruit's
network integration, ideological affinity with the movement, and commitment to an
activist identity, as well as his receptivity to more costly forms of participation. It is
this type of gradual recruitment process that is likely to foster high-risk/cost
activism.
14 1
The relationship to the process of criminal desistance is clear.
Offenders seeking to break from crime, a different type of "high-risk"
activism, slowly begin to "play at" a new identity and make initial and safe
forays into a more prosocial life.' 42  They develop new, non-criminal
preferences and slowly begin to realign their social networks to include
more conventional people. These more conventional people are important
sources of social capital who provide support for their new identities, a
normative climate that supports prosocial conduct and information about
jobs, treatment programs, housing, and the availability of financial
assistance.143 Those wishing to quit crime are more likely to be successful
at desistance if they are embedded in social networks that not only support
... Id. at 653.
138 McADAM, supra note, at 41.
131 Id. at 51.
140 Id.
141 McAdam, Recruitment, supra note, at 69-70.
142 See WARR, supra note; Warr, supra note.
143 James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc.
S97-105 (1988).
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their new identities and tastes but also isolate them from those who would
oppose them quitting crime or induce them to continue in their criminal
ways.
This would suggest that success in desisting from crime is more likely
when offenders who have made the decision to leave crime and become
prosocial have at least mixed pro- and antisocial social networks (it is very
doubtful that non-trivial criminal offenders would have exclusively pro-
social networks). The first movements toward desistance would be to
strengthen their relationships with prosocial others and distance themselves
(emotionally and physically) from those who would oppose their new
identity. In addition, these movements are likely to be very tentative and
mundane at first, as the process of becoming a committed prosocial person
is neither easy nor guaranteed. The more that offenders are embedded in
criminal contexts (the more the mix of their social network favors the
antisocial over the prosocial), the greater the obstacle of isolation from
support for their fledging conventional identites will be. These offenders
will face more opposition to their new identity and will be less likely to
encounter other prosocial opportunities, like job prospects.
We think that the change in preferences that comes with a change in
self-identity explains why failures occur and why successes, when they
occur, are gradual. While dissatisfaction with crime brought about by a
crystallization of discontent can lead an offender to want to change his
identity and preferences, he may misjudge the satisfactions that he will
enjoy with the new preferences.1 44 That is, I can imagine myself with
different preferences in the future (a more conventional life, a job "I'm just
getting by on," a steady partner to whom I return after work every day, or
being around the kids) but may easily misjudge in the present that these, in
fact, are the preferences that I want or that will make me happy in the
future. If I fail to predict my future preferences accurately, I will become
dissatisfied, and I will likely face a setback in my attempt at deliberate self-
change. In sum, desistance from crime is not easy; in fact, it is exceedingly
difficult, and many who embark on the path of self-change fail and do so
repeatedly. Change does occur, however, and when it does, we think it
frequently occurs when offenders are motivated by the self they want to
become as well as what they fear they will become if they do not change.
Offenders who desist, then, successfully break themselves from their past.
III. RESEARCH ON IDENTITY AND DESISTANCE
Our conjecture about how a change in identity is related to a decline in
criminal behavior is for now just that-a conjecture. We hope that the
144 Loewenstein & Angner, supra note, at 352-53.
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theoretical work discussed herein will motivate some empirical research
into the causal mechanisms we have outlined, linking identity with changes
in preferences, social networks, and ultimately desistance from crime.
Research in this area should proceed along two tracks. The first track
should involve research on how to measure identity shifts and connect those
shifts both backward to the crystallization of discontent that initiatally
motivated the identity change and forward to attempts to change social
networks, preferences, and other connections to fit a more conventional life.
Recent work by Thomas LeBel et al. demonstrates that it is possible to
measure subjective mental states that appear to both directly and indirectly
affect the process of desistance. 145 More generally, we fully agree with
Laub and Sampson that "[w]e need to find a way to measure individual
motivation, free will, and ultimately the decision to initiate and embrace the
process of change., 146 As shown in the work of LeBel et al. and Greg
Pogarsky, it may be possible to exploit existing datasets that measure the
subjective framework of the individual subjects. 147 It might also be possible
to exploit the dramatic growth in prison-based treatment that focuses on
cognitive restructuring and the development of new patterns of thinking and
decision making.148 Many of these treatment programs are accompanied by
risk assessment instruments that assess "dynamic" features, which include
subjective cognitive states. Explicitly qualitative studies that rely on both
prospective and retrospective assessment of an individual's identity will
also be important.
149
Related to this, we also think that efforts should be made to assess
features of an individual's preferences, which we believe are a function of
one's identity. The most obvious example of such a preference is one's
time preference or discount rate.1 50 Behavioral economists and cognitive
psychologists have created an impressive literature on the nature of time
145 Thomas P. LeBel et al., The "Chicken and Egg" of Subjective and Social Factors in
Desistance from Crime, 5 EuR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 131 (2008).
146 Laub & Sampson, supra note, at 51.
147 See LeBel et al., supra note , at 135-37; Greg Pogarsky, Deterrence and Individual
Differences Among Convicted Offenders, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 64-66 (2007).
148 See, e.g., D.A. ANDREwS & J. BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT (3d
ed. 2003); JAMES McGUIRE, HM INSPECTORATE OF PROBATION, COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL
APPROACHES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH (2000), available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/inspectoratesfhmi-probation/docs/cogbehl 
-rps.pdf.
149 In this spirit, Paternoster is initiating a research project to examine the long-term
changes in identity, social networks, and "life conditions" of a sample of ex-offender addicts
released from a state prison in the early 1990s. The research will employ detailed interviews
with these former (and some current) inmates in an attempt to document both the objective
conditions of their lives after prison and their subjective understanding of those conditions,
including any changes in identity.
150 Frederick, supra note.
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discount factors and how they vary within a population. 151  With the
exception of some work in the deterrence literature, 152 there has been little
application of these ideas in criminology despite the inherent linkage to the
central concept of impulsivity.' 53  Links to this literature provide
criminologists with a precisely specified concept for which clear
measurement strategies have been developed. Criminologists also have a
potential contribution to make in this area by describing the way in which
time preferences change with age and how this is connected eventually to
desistance. Only limited work has been done thus far, 154 but empirical
evidence about the shift in time preferences for a population of desisting
criminals would provide strong evidence about the role of identity shifts in
explaining desistance.
A second and less conventional research track should focus on
studying the process of desistance as a time series. Time-series analysis is
focused on identifying and explaining the process that generates the
series,' 55 an analytical framework that fits well with explaining desistance.
Time series analyses should start with tests for stationarity; if individuals
are found to follow a non-stationary time series, focus should be on
explaining that non-stationarity. As we will argue below, identity theory
can be conceptualized as a time series with a structural break. Therefore,
support for identity theory can be developed by demonstrating the existence
of structural breaks in an individual time series of criminal offending.
Although somewhat foreign to the study of individuals, criminology as a
field is comfortable with this basic analytic strategy within the context of
the aggregate study of crime rates, where much work has focused on the
character of these time series.' 56 In the next Part, we will discuss this idea
in a little more detail, but space constraints limit how much it can be
developed here.
151 For an exhaustive review, see Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, & Ted
O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 351 (2002).
152 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity and
Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39
CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001).
153 See Daniel S. Nagin, Moving Choice to Center Stage in Criminological Research and
Theory: The American Society of Criminology 2006 Sutherland Address, 45 CRIMINOLOGY
259 (2007).
154 See, e.g., Read & Read, supra note.
155 David MeDowall et al., No. 07-02 1, Interrupted Time Series Analysis (1980).
156 See, e.g., David McDowall & Colin Loftin, Are U.S. Crime Rates Historically
Contingent?, 42 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 359 (2005); Robert M. O'Brien, Theory,
Operationalization, Identification and the Interpretation of Different Differences in Time
Series Models, 17 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 359 (2001); William Spelman, Specifying
the Relationship Between Crime and Prisons, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 149 (2008).
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IV. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DESISTANCE: THE
OFFENDING CAREER AS A TIME SERIES
The starting point of time series regression revolves around thinking
about the stochastic process that is generating the data. In its most basic
form, any time series can be described (not explained) by the following
autoregressive time series: 157
Y, = a+pY,_, +e,1.1)
where e, is a time series of uncorrelated shocks. A key assumption of time
series analysis is that the process is weakly stationary, which simply means
that the first and second moments of the parameters of the model-in this
case, ox, p and var(e)-are stable throughout the time period. Our main, and
most important, assertion is that this kind of process, with time constant
parameters, cannot create the long term path of desistance as described by
Sampson and Laub 5 8 or Arjan Blokland et al. t 59 The kind of path described
by equation 1.1 will move to its equilibrium level and then stay flat with
short term variation around the equilibrium line. Laub and Sampson are
right: state dependence and individual heterogeneity as captured in the
lagged Y term in equation 1.1 cannot explain desistance.1 60 We restate this
important observation in time series language: we think desistance is
inherently a non-stationary process.
Practitioners of time series analysis recognize that the first step in any
time series analysis involves a test for stationarity.1 61 This is logical. If the
parameters are inconstant and we use regression models, which assume
time-constant parameters, then the estimates will be biased. A researcher
can make a non-stationary time series stationary by taking differences or
detrending. The researcher then focuses on explaining the resulting
stationary time series. In this case, however, we are not interested in the
stationary part of the time series. Rather, we are interested in first
characterizing and then explaining the non-stationary part of the time series,
the long-term path or trajectory over time.162
We are not aware of any previous attempt to test for stationarity in
longitudinal individual data in criminology, so we will illustrate our point
157 The following is the simplest possible dynamic model. It can be generalized by
including more lags. However, the basic concepts apply.
158 Sampson & Laub, supra note, at 36-60.
159 Blokland et al., supra note.
160 LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note.
161 MCCLEARY & HAY, supra note.
162 D. Wayne Osgood, Making Sense of Crime and the Life Course, 602 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 196 (2005).
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with some preliminary time series analyses of the Cambridge Study in
Delinquency Development (CSDD) data. 163 The CSDD is a prospective
longitudinal survey of 411 South London males. 164 Data collection began
when the boys were eight years old, and conviction data were obtained for
these boys from age ten to age fifty. 165 Time series techniques designed to
deal with discrete dependent variables are in their infancy, which means
that most time series analyses are done with ordinary least squares models.
But in this paper, we have asserted that desistance is a process by which the
latent propensity to commit crime changes over time. As such, we want to
study the continuous latent propensity and not the realization of this latent
propensity. Therefore, we first used non-parametric smoothers on the forty-
year CSDD time series conviction data to create a continuous trajectory of
estimated p's, where p = Prob(conviction) for a given year. Although most
previous work with this dataset has focused on frequency, or lambda, in this
application for the study of desistance we focus on prevalence. This
approach simply creates an estimate of the probability of convictions for
each year of age and, in this sense, is analogous to what growth curve
models do for the population.
166
Although we estimated continuous trajectories of the latent probability
of conviction for all 411 subjects, in what follows we will focus only on 24
individuals, displayed in Figure 1, who follow what we believe most people
would agree are desistance trajectories. Each of these individuals have
initially high levels of offending propensity that descend to zero levels of
propensity for at least ten years by age fifty. The average number of
convictions for these twenty-four people is eight, with some having as few
as four and one (the highest) having eighteen. Some of the trajectories are
the traditional upside down U-shape, while others are double-peaked. The
trajectories are considerably noisier than what one gets in group trajectory
163 FARRINGTON ET AL., supra note . We thank David Farrington for his generosity in
letting us use these data.
164 id.
165 id.
166 The difference is that we created the trajectory for each individual, and we did not fit
a polynomial function form; instead we used a smoothing function in STATA that,
sequentially, did median smoothers of four, two, five, and three spans (number of
observations around a given Y) followed by a Hanning linear smoother, and did each
sequence twice. The results reported below do not appear to be overly sensitive to the type
of smoother we used (we get largely similar results when we did a simple three-period
moving average to smooth the time series). We are however open to discussions about the
best way to proceed. In this paper we are simply trying to briefly present a concrete example
of a time series analysis with individual-level data.
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analysis, reflecting the focus here on one individual path without smoothing
from the overall group.
67
For these twenty-four individual time series, we conducted a standard
Dickey-Fuller unit root test for each and every time series. This test starts
from the null hypothesis that the series is non-stationary. 68 Using a 5%
level of significance, we were not able to reject the null hypothesis of a
non-stationary time series in any of the cases. To repeat, in all of the cases
in which we estimated a trajectory for the probability of conviction that was
different from a constant at zero, we accepted the null hypothesis that the
time series was non-stationary. We also used the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test for stationarity (with zero lags). Unlike the
Dickey-Fuller test, which assumes non-stationarity, the KPSS test assumes
stationarity. This test was developed because of concerns about the low
power of the Dickey-Fuller test that makes it difficult to reject the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity. 169 We were able to reject the null hypothesis
of stationarity (with no trends) for twenty-three of the twenty-four time
series (we could not reject for person # 403) using the KPSS test. These
results confirm for the first time our basic assertion that desistance
trajectories are inherently non-stationary. To be clear, this does not mean
that these twenty-three time series lend credence to our identity theory but
simply open the possibility that they may be characterized as having a
structural break, which would be consistent with the theory.
Figure 1
Desistance Trajectories from the Cambridge Data
167 Osgood, supra note.
168 We did not use the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, which uses lags to control for serial
correlated errors. The problem here is that lags force the researcher to discard observations
at the beginning of the time series. A lag of four means that we will discard the observations
from ages ten to thirteen. The tests for optimal lags routinely found optimal lags of eight or
nine, which means that the results were "best" when we start at seventeen or eighteen-after
the hump of adolescence. This makes little sense in this context, given our interest in
explaining the full desistance trajectory. However, it is also clear to us that individual time
series of individual offending propensity will be serially correlated. As an alternative, we
also used the Phillips Perron test, using Newey-West standard errors to correct for serial
correlation (which does not use the lagged differences), and found the same answer. We
failed to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in all cases.
169 Denis Kwiatkowski et al., Testing the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity Against the
Alternative of a Unit Root, 54 J. ECONOMETRICS 159 (1992).
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The next step is to identify or try to explain the non-stationarity. The
simplest form of non-stationary time series is a random walk, a well-known
form that has been found to occur in many contexts, including the stock
market price of a company, the financial status of a gambler, and both
aggregate unemployment and crime levels in the United States.170 Random
walks have a unit root, which means that the parameter p = 1 or to be more
specific:
Y, = a+ Y,_1 +e, (1.2)
According to equation 1.2, change from period x to x+1 is equal to
some constant plus a random shock. The series has an infinite memory,
since any shock is permanently incorporated into the time series. Random
walks do not, therefore, return to any mean. The same formula can generate
flat, increasing, decreasing, or U-shaped curves, depending entirely on the
time series of uncorrelated shocks e,.
This description of a random walk is consistent with the Laub and
Sampson characterization of life course theories of desistance as the result
of a series of "random events," "desistance by default," or "macro-level
shocks largely beyond the pale of individual choice (for example, war,
depression, natural disasters, revolutions, plant closings, or industrial
restructuring)."' 7' Random walks are inherently unpredictable, and, as
described by Laub and Sampson, this lack of predictability is the key factor
which distinguishes life course trajectories from predetermined
developmental trajectories. 172 In a world of random walks, we can no
longer predict long-term change, and the idea of explaining long-term
change becomes conceptually meaningless. 173 In that context, we need to
focus our attention on explaining change in any given period, which is
driven by these relatively exogenous life events. This conclusion is
consistent with empirical practice: if a time series is a true random walk, the
only feasible strategy is to explain period-to-period change. It is simply not
possible to explain any long-term pattern, because that long-term pattern is
driven by random shocks. Although we are not sure that any of the current
desistance theories in criminology fully qualify as random walk theories,
170 For an accessible presentation of random walks, see MCCLEARY & HAY, supra note.
For a more detailed but still intuitive presentation, see WILLIAM FELLER, 2 AN INTRODUCTION
TO PROBABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS (1971). For examples of random walks in
crime time series, see David F. Greenberg, Time Series Analysis of Crime Rates, 17 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 291 (2001); David McDowall, Tests of Nonlinear Dynamics in
U.S. Homicide Time Series, and Their Implications, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 711 (2002); Spellman,
supra note.
171 LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note, at 34.
172 id.
173 Osgood, supra note.
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we are comfortable asserting that in the extreme, life course processes (as
described by Glen Elder) would follow a random walk. 174
Not all non-stationary processes are random walks, however. An
alternative non-stationary time series is a series with a structural break. In
other words, the time series appears norn-stationary, but it is actually
stationary with a structural break. Once the structural break is accounted
for, the time series is stationary. Although there are multiple forms of
structural breaks, one version implies that there are two sets of parameters
across time periods. 17
5
y a +p Y_ +e, if t<T
a b + pYl, +eb, ift>T
The above equation represents an exogenous structural break. David
McDowall and Colin Loftin present a discussion of an endogenous
structural break, where the different formulas apply for different levels of Y
rather than for different time periods. 76  In that case, the break is
endogenous because it depends on the time series itself.
177
Criminological theorists have not formally discussed structural breaks
in the context of individual time series, but we see elements of structural
breaks in some desistance theories. For example, the notion of age-graded
causal factors is consistent with the idea that the values of coefficients on
some time-varying variables vary over time. For example, if employment is
inversely related to offending during adulthood but not during adolescence,
we have structural coefficients that vary with time, which could generate
time-varying u. or p in equation 1.3.178 Christopher Uggen's work,
following this model, describes a structural break in an individual time
series where employment had an effect on recidivism for those over the age
of twenty-six but not on younger offenders. 1
79
A more general way of thinking about structural breaks is to consider
that a relatively time-stable component of an individual, such as self-
control, changes over time. This is only relevant if life events and the
social context interact with self-control to affect behavior. In Terence
174 Glen H. Elder, Jr., The Life Course as Developmental Theory, 69 CHILD DEV. 1
(1998).
175 McCLEARY & HAY, supra note.
176 McDowall & Loftin, supra note.
17 Id. at 362-63.
178 Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A
Duration Model ofAge, Employment, and Recidivism, 65 AM. Soc. REV. 529 (2000).
179 Id.
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Thornberry's interactional model, for example, the exact nature of state
dependence depends in meaningful ways on the individual's relatively
stable characteristics.1 80  Those individuals who are heavily embedded in
crime are less "dynamic," in that they are less responsive to changes in their
environment and therefore are also less state-dependent. Daniel Nagin and
Raymond Paternoster built on this idea in their own version of an
interactional theory when they posited that the impact of sanctions on an
individual depend in meaningful ways on the individual's level of self-
control.' 81  Although not developed further by Nagin and Paternoster,
subsequent empirical work by Bradley Wright and his colleagues has found
evidence of an interaction between life events and stable individual
characteristics, such as self-control. 182  If this basic preference function
shifts over time in meaningful ways, as suggested by Carter Hay and Walter
Forrest, we can have a situation in which the same inputs and opportunities
lead to different behaviors and state-dependent processes can start to push
people in a different direction. 8 3  This situation, where a person
experiences different causal processes depending on changes in his or her
underlying preferences, extends interactional theories, such as theories of
personal identity, to accommodate a structural break and strengthens the
ability of these types of theories to explain long-term changes in offending
propensity.
180 Terence P. Thornberry, Toward an Interactional Theory of Delinquency, 25
CRIMINOLOGY 863 (1986); see also Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-
Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674
(1993).
181 Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Personal Capital and Social Control: The
Deterrence Implications of a Theory of Individual Differences in Offending, 32
CRIMINOLOGY 581 (1994).
182 See Bradley R. E. Wright et al., Does the Perceived Risk of Punishment Deter
Criminally-Prone Individuals? Rational Choice, Self-Control, and Crime, 41 J. RES. CRIME
& DELINQ. 180 (2004); Bradley R. Entner Wright et al., The Effects of Social Ties on Crime
Vary by Criminal Propensity: A Life-Course Model of Interdependence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY
321 (2001); see also Carter Hay & Walter Forrest, Self-Control Theory and the Concept of
Opportunity: Making the Case for a More Systematic Union, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 1039 (2008);
Graham C. Ousey, & Pamela Wilcox, Interactions Between Antisocial Propensity and Life-
Course Varying Correlates of Delinquent Behavior: Differences by Method of Estimation
and Implications for Theory, 45 CRIMINOLOGY 313 (2007); Pogarsky, supra note. Wright et
al. finds, in contrast to Nagin and Paternoster's prediction, that those with the most self-
control are the least responsive to structural events. Another study, described in Elaine
Eggleston Doherty, Self-Control, Social Bonds, and Desistance: A Test of Life-Course
Interdependence, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 807 (2006), found no evidence of an interaction between
social bonds and social control. The latter result could be explained by Doherty's use of a
sample of serious juvenile delinquents rather than a more heterogeneous general population
sample.
183 Hay & Forrest, supra note.
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This recognition brings identity theory to the forefront of theoretical
discussions about exactly how desistance from crime takes place. The
importance of identity theories from this perspective is that they provide an
explanation for how fundamental individual characteristics, such as self-
control, can change. Changes in identity can trigger fundamental shifts in
how people value the future (time discounting), or value their social
relationships. Simply saying that preferences change is easy; explaining the
mechanism by which they change is both important and difficult. As
described above, identity theorists like Giordano and her colleagues offer
social psychological theories of desistance that revolve around exogenous
structural breaks in the process that generate crime. 184 While building on
their work, we outlined a slightly different explanation focused on the idea
of the possible self. This idea corresponds most closely to the idea of an
endogenous break because it implies that the break occurs when a person
reaches a certain level of propensity and decides that she wants to change.
However, unlike a typical non-linear model, the process does not revert
back to the original process when the level changes, but rather continues.
Testing for an identity theory using time series methods would need to
begin by examining whether the data can be described as a time series with
a structural break perhaps using the Quandt-Andrews test statistics for
structural breaks.' 85 The Quandt-Andrews test would allow us to test for a
structural break, and identify the most likely break point. The Quandt-
Andrews test is based on a Chow test, which estimates a regression model
on two subsamples and then uses an F-test to determine if the coefficients
are different in the two models.' 86 The Quandt-Andrews test expands Chow
by eliminating the need to know the correct break point. The approach
involves conducting the test in all possible subsets, in effect searching for
the "best possible" break point. 187 Because this test involves a number of
statistical tests, the standard chi-square distribution will lead to biased
inferences. Donald Andrews developed the appropriate sampling
distribution for the test, which is why the test is known as the Quandt-
184 MARUNA, supra note ; Farrall, supra note ; Farrall & Maruna, supra note ; Giordano
et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance, supra note ; Maruna, supra note ; Maruna & Roy,
supra note.
185 See Donald W. K. Andrews, Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change
with Unknown Change Point, 61 ECONOMETRICA 821 (1993); Bruce E. Hansen, The New
Economics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in U.S. Labor Productivity, 15 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 117 (2001). For a criminological example of a test for structural breaks, see
McDowall & Loftin, supra note.
186 Gregory C. Chow, Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear
Regressions, 28 ECONOMETRICA 591 (1960).
187 Richard E. Quandt, Tests of the Hypothesis that a Linear Regression Obeys Two
Separate Regimes, 55 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 324-29 (1960).
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Andrews test. 188 While such a test is beyond the scope of this paper, it
could be implemented on the Cambridge data described in this section. 189
Analytically, we are interested in both the existence and timing of
structural breaks in individual-level time series. Our identity theory is only
plausible if there is empirical evidence in favor of structural breaks. And,
assuming that there are structural breaks, the distribution of age at which
the breaks occur would be an important fact that desistance theories would
need to explain. For our identity theory, we would need to predict the
timing of the structural break across individuals using our focus on the
possible self. We would predict the arrival of the structural break to occur
around times when an accumulation of negative life events leads to a
realization and a structured attempt to create a change in the way an
individual interacts with her world. It is unclear whether the data would
support a detailed analysis of the nature of the structural break, but this type
of analysis could distinguish between different versions of identity theory.
V. PARTING COMPANY WITH OTHERS
Before us, Laub and Sampson and Giordano, Cernkovich, and
Rudolph have presented detailed and well known theories of criminal
desistance.1 90  Although a comprehensive discussion of their work is
beyond the scope of this paper, given their prominence in discussions of
desistance within the field it is necessary to indicate briefly where our
theory parts company from theirs so that one can more clearly see what our
work adds to the debate.
With respect to the work of Laub and Sampson, the most direct
statement we can make is that, in our theory, social identity and human
agency play a far more important role in explaining desistance from crime.
While it comes with some hazard to speak of criminal desistance
188 Andrews, supra note.
189 See supra note and accompanying text.
190 LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note ; Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance,
supra note ; Giordano et al., Emotions and Crime, supra note ; Robert J. Sampson et al.,
Assessing Sampson and Laub 's Life-Course Theory of Crime, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS
OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 313 (Francis T. Cullen, John Paul Wright & Kristie R. Blevins
eds., 2006); Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, A General Age-Graded Theory of Crime:
Lessons Learned and the Future of Life-Course Criminology, in INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENTAL AND LIFE COURSE THEORIES OF OFFENDING 165 (David P. Farrington ed.,
2005) [hereinafter Sampson & Laub, General Age-Graded Theory]; Robert J. Sampson &
John H. Laub, A Life-Course View of the Development of Crime, 602 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 12 (2005) [hereinafter Sampson & Laub, Life-Course View]; Robert J.
Sampson & John H. Laub, When Prediction Fails: From Crime-Prone Boys to
Heterogeneity in Adulthood, 602 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 73 (2005) [hereinafter
Sampson & Laub, When Prediction Fails].
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explanations as being either "structuration" theories (which account for
desistance in terms of the social structures within which individuals live,
such as jobs, marriages, or peer groups) or "human development" theories
(which account for desistance in terms of human agency and choice), it is
clear that different desistance theories place greater weight or emphasis on
one or the other component.191 Our reading of their work is that Sampson
and Laub take a distinctly structural position regarding why offenders cease
committing crimes. Their view is that structural events such as good jobs,
good marriages, reform school experiences, and military service reduce
crime by limiting the opportunities to commit crime largely without the
actor himself ever being aware of the fact that he is being changed. The
image of the criminal actor they embody in their theory is one who does not
intentionally create his own life or choose his own desistance and instead is
one who responds or simply reacts to events that he finds himself in, but
having had no or little part in creating.' 92 Although Laub and Sampson do
include a consideration of human agency in their theory, it is clear that
human agency plays a backseat to structural influences. There are two
reasons we think this is true.
First, they give great prominence in their theory to something called
"desistance by default," which occurs when former offenders stop
committing crimes not because they deliberately decide to "go straight" and
intentionally change things in their lives, but simply because they find
themselves in different circumstances and, as a result, stop committing
crime. 1 93 While it is no doubt true that this kind of accidental desistance
may occasionally occur, as the passage below makes clear, Laub and
Sampson make it not merely a possibility, but apparently something that
occurs more often than not:
Our stance on the desistance process contrasts with emerging theories of desistance
that emphasize cognitive transformations or identity shifts as necessary for desistance
to occur .... We believe that most offenders desist in response to structural turning
points that serve as the catalyst for long-term behavioral change. The image of
"desistance by default" best fits the desistance process we found in our data.
Desistance for our subjects was not necessarily a conscious or deliberate process, but
rather the consequence of what Howard Becker calls side bets .... Many men made
a commitment to go straight without even realizing it .... Our main point is that
many of the desisters did not seek to make good-they simply desisted with little if
any cognitive reflection on the matter. 
194
191 Stephen Farrall & Benjamin Bowling, Structuration, Human Development and
Desistance from Crime, 39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 253 (1999).
192 LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note, at 145-49.
' Id. at 278-79.
194 Id. (emphasis added).
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For Laub and Sampson, the process of desistance that "best fits the
data" is one in which former offenders do not deliberately seek to change
themselves or their lives. There is very little of what we have described in
our social identity theory as intentional self-change. Rather, in Laub and
Sampson's theory of desistance, offenders are changed by events that they
have neither deliberately created nor apparently have control over.' 95 They
react and respond but do not act or create. To us, this seems to give very
little, if any, room for the operation of human agency. The difference
between the image of the desisting criminal offender in their theory and
ours and between their structural explanation of personal change and our
identity explanation is perhaps nowhere made more evident than in a quote
from Howard Becker that Laub and Sampson approvingly provide:
A structural explanation of personal change has important implications for attempts to
deliberately mold human behavior. In particular, it suggests that we need not try to
develop deep and lasting interests, be they values or personality traits, in order to
produce the behavior we want. It is enough to create situations which will coerce
people into behaving as we want them to and then to create the conditions under
which other rewards will become linked to continuing this behavior. 
196
To Sampson and Laub, desistance is brought about when external
events coerce former offenders into changing their behavior if not against
their will then certainly against their knowledge and their active
participation. 97 In our view, the criminal offender at some point comes to
the realization that an identity as a criminal offender is more costly than the
possible self of a non-offender. The possible self of a non-offender
provides a current offender with a specific and realistic route, roadmap, or
strategy to take in order to realize that self, and steps that can be
deliberately taken to change one's life in a way consistent with that self. It
is precisely this effort at intentional self change that we have described in
this Article as evidence of human agency, and it is a fundamental
195 Id. at 148-49, 278-79.
196 Id. at 149 (emphasis added) (quoting Howard S. Becker, Personal Change in Adult
Life, 27 SOCIOMETRY 40, 52-53 (1964)).
197 We must admit that Laub and Sampson have not been completely consistent on this
point. Elsewhere in their book and other writings, they seem to imply that human agency
does play an important role in their theory: "For a number of our formerly delinquent men,
personal agency looms large in the processes of persistence and desistance from crime."
LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note, at 280. Perhaps the "number" is a small number compared
with those who desisted without ever realizing it? Ultimately we are convinced that a theory
of desistance cannot give an "important role" or "prominence" to both human agency and
desistance by default. In addition, their view that structural factors can coerce humans to
behave in appropriate ways is inconsistent with any identity theory of desistance such as
ours, or even one based on the kinds of cognitive transformations described by Giordano et
al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance, supra note.
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component in the process of criminal desistance. For us, actors deliberately
create change; they are not coerced into it by external structural events.
Second, this belief that offenders can be coerced to behave in ways
that we (but not necessarily they) want them to is consistent with the
process through which Laub and Sampson argue that structural factors
work. Following Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, we can think of
structural events like marriage and securing a good job as leading to
desistance because they reduce the propensity to commit crime (criminality)
or its opportunity (crime). 198  To us, a change in one's identity, the
assumption of a possible self that is non-offending and conventional, results
in a change in criminal propensity. One who has undergone an identity
change is, therefore, a different kind of person. When asked why things
like good marriages and stable jobs reduce crime, Laub and Sampson argue
that they work not principally because they reduce criminality or the
individual's propensity to commit crime, but because they reduce the
opportunity to commit a crime. 199 In discussing what they refer to as their
"revised" aged-graded informal social control theory, they state that
institutions like marriage, employment, and the military influence
desistance from crime for one of four reasons: (1) they "knife off' the past
from the present; (2) they provide greater supervision and monitoring of the
person and provide new sources of social control and "growth"; (3) they
change and structure routine activities; and (4) they provide for identity
transformation. 200  It seems quite clear that the first three mechanisms
facilitate desistance by reducing the opportunity for crime, while only the
last provides for a change in propensity.
Further, although they state that they believe that a good marriage
changes both the opportunity and propensity for crime,20 1 they also seem to
have abandoned the metaphor of a good marriage as a "turning point.',
20 2
198 GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note, at 85-120.
199 LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note ; Sampson & Laub, General Age-Graded Theory, supra
note; Sampson & Laub, Life-Course View, supra note ; Sampson & Laub, When Prediction
Fails, supra note; Sampson et al., supra note.
200 LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note, at 148-49, 278-79; Sampson et al., supra note, at 324.
201 Sampson & Laub, When Prediction Fails, supra note, at 74.
202 See Sampson & Laub, Life-Course View, supra note ; Robert J. Sampson et al., Does
Marriage Reduce Crime? A Counter-Factual Approach to Within-Individual Causal Effects,
44 CRIMINOLOGY 465 (2006). With respect to the former, Sampson and Laub argue, "[W]e
believe that marriage has an effect on both propensity and events or opportunities to offend."
Sampson & Laub, Life-Course View, supra note , at 74. While they are clear with respect to
how marriage changes opportunity, they are not with respect to how it changes propensity,
except that it does not change a person's identity. With respect to the latter, they have
written that
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Marriage does not seem to produce a long-term change in behavior (that is,
it does not fundamentally change the person by affecting their propensity to
crime), but inhibits crime only while someone is "in the state of
marriage. 2 °3  The "marriage effect" disappears when one is out of this
state.204 In other words, marriage changes crime but not criminality. We
think we have outlined a theory of desistance that is clear in the implication
that while certainly opportunities for some kinds of crime diminish over
time, other opportunities abound and that the explanatory weight for any
theory of desistance must rest upon explaining how criminal propensity
may change over time.
2°5
Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph have constructed a theory of
criminal desistance that relies heavily on symbolic interactionism and the
"cognitive transformations" that former offenders must undergo before
ceasing crime.206 As such, it is less structural than Sampson and Laub's.
Giordano, Cernkovich, and Rudolph's central idea is that structural changes
in the lives of offenders, such as changes in marital partners and jobs, are
insufficient to explain desistance from crime.20 7 What must first occur, they
argue, is a "cognitive shift" or transformation in the minds of the offenders
which takes place as they begin to make initial movements toward a
[i]t follows from this theoretical conceptualization that the mechanisms associated with marriage
are not a constant once set in motion and thus vary through time. The spousal monitoring of
drinking patterns, for example, is predicted to vary over time depending on the state of whether
one is in or out of a marital relationship .... In dynamic terms, marriage is thus not seen as a
single turning point but as part of a potential causal dynamic over the life course.
Sampson & Laub, When Prediction Fails, supra note, at 34.
203 Sampson & Laub, Life-Course View, supra note , at 34; see also Blokland &
Nieuwbeerta, supra note.
204 Sampson et al., supra note, at 492-94.
205 There is an implication in their work that by human agency Sampson and Laub mean
the capacity to make choices. They note that "[t]he modified theory refers to agentic moves
within structural context as 'situated choice."' Sampson et al., supra note, at 323. They
also state that "human agency is intentional action that may or may not be accompanied by
an identity change." Id. at 326. This would seem to push their notion of human agency
close to a rational choice view, but they have apparently rejected this possibility: "In
ongoing work, we make what we believe is a crucial distinction between human agency and
rational choice .... In our view, the rational choice perspective views agency as a static
entity representing the stable part of the person as well as within-individual variation over
time that is largely driven by age. What is lacking in rational choice is the recognition that
'we construct our preferences. We choose preferences and actions jointly, in part, to
discover-or construct-new preferences that are currently unknown."' Sampson & Laub,
Life-Course View, supra note , at 38 (internal citations omitted) (citing James G. March,
Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BELL J. EcoN. 587, 596
(1978)).
206 Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance, supra note, at 992-93.
207 Id. at 1000-01.
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different, more conventional, way of life.2°8  These cognitive
transformations, which may include a change in identity and felt
preferences for crime, enable the actor to actively pursue behaviors that lead
209to greater conventionality. Cognitive transformations (or lack thereof)
also explain why change can occur in the absence of structural supports for
change, and why some who have prosocial structural supports for change
fail to take advantage of them.2'0 There are four basic types of cognitive
transformations in Giordano, Cemkovich, and Rudolph's scheme: (1) the
actor becomes more open to change; (2) the actor sees greater opportunities
or "hooks" for change in their social environment; (3) the actor envisions a
"replacement self," a new identity that is perceived to be incompatible with
criminality; or (4) the actor views criminal behavior in an entirely different
211light. They clearly argue that their theory is "not fundamentally
incompatible with" a more structural approach, such as Sampson and
Laub's, which emphasizes the changing potential of marriages and jobs, but
simply is a conceptual explanation of the "up front" cognitive work that
takes place before structural factors come into play.212
This cognitive transformation theory of criminal desistance shares
some important common ground with our own. First, they, like us, place
great emphasis on the role of the actor as human agent in creating change in
his life rather than merely reacting to structural events.213 We view identity
change via a conventional possible self as the critical "up front" work
offenders need to undergo before change in behavior can occur. Our notion
of identity change and the replacement self is clearly part of what Giordano
et al. mean by a cognitive transformation via the "replacement self." While
structural changes are critically important in maintaining identity change in
both theories, the most important causal factor is the actor herself. We
would agree with their observation that "our emphasis on cognitions and
human agency necessarily draws attention to the individual." 214 In our
theory and theirs, then, the individual is required to undergo some
fundamental change of self (who one is, how one thinks, and how one
behaves), and it is this change of identity (our theory) or cognitive
transformation (their theory) which leads the person to change his life by,
for example, finding a job, marrying a conventional person, or finding
conventional peers.
208 Id. at 1002-03.
209 id. at 1055.
210 Id. at 1000-04.
211 Id. at 1000-03.
212 Id. at 991-92.
213 Id. at 992-93.
214 Id. at 1003.
1152 [Vol. 99
DESISTANCE AND THE "FEARED SELF"
Second, cessation from crime is more likely if the identity change or
cognitive transformation is not simply a self-enhancing, "I want to be a
better person" kind of change, but one that comes with a specific and
realistic strategy for change. In Giordano et al.'s discussion of prison and
treatment as a hook for change, they alluded to the fact that treatment
programs can assist in the transformation process to the extent that they
provide a specific "cognitive blueprint" as to exactly how one goes about
changing oneself.215 This is very similar to the role of the self-regulating
component of the possible self in our theory. Both the replacement self and
the cognitive blueprint it can provide are instrumental in making change
take place.
Although compatible with Giordano et al.'s theory of cognitive
transformation at many points, there is at least one fundamental difference
between our theory and theirs: the generality of our theories. We have
argued that a change in identity from a criminal offender to a non-offender
is a process that everyone who successfully desists from crime must
undergo. Unless there is a change in identity, an understanding of a
possible self as a non-offender, then the kinds of structural supports for
change (a conventional job and a new social network) are unlikely to be
created, and ultimately desistance from crime will not occur. Giordano et
al. have argued that the cognitive transformations they talk about are only
applicable in a limited range.216 Their position is that cognitive
transformations only play an important role in criminal desistance in the
mid-range of structural opportunities for change.21 7 When the offender
lives in a social environment of extreme disadvantage or an environment of
relatively great advantage, the cognitive transformations they describe do
218
not matter. Cognitive transformations are unlikely to be enough for
change to occur under conditions of great deprivation and are not necessary
when there are abundant structural advantages. 1 9 We respectfully disagree.
Though the number of places at which there may be failure increases in an
environment of deprivation, identity change is still necessary. Whether
social supports for a change in one's behavior from criminal to non-
offender are meager or abundant, they will not likely be perceived nor taken
advantage of unless the foundation of social identity change we have
described has first occurred.
Finally, although there are important points of convergence between
our views and those of Giordano et al., she and her colleagues have taken a
215 Id. at 1033-34.
216 Id. at 1026-27.
217 id.
218 Id.
219 id.
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different direction in their more recent work.220 In a 2007 paper, Giordano
et al. presented a theory of desistance which seems to move clearly away
from the cognitive and individualist position taken in the earlier theory
toward one which places great weight on social processes, particularly the
social origins of emotional states and the way a revisiting of emotional
issues can lead to desisting from crime.221
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have outlined a theory of criminal desistance that is
anchored in notions of identity and human agency. Our theory builds both
upon the important work of others before us that have directly addressed the
issue of desistance from crime and on an integration of such diverse fields
as social and cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and the
sociology of collective movements.222 We have used this prior work to
construct an identity theory of desistance that compliments existing work,
but also raises challenges and plots new areas of theoretical development
and research.
One of the theoretical areas in need of further development is how
conventional opportunities arrive for those wishing to leave crime. While
most theories of desistance agree that conventional institutions such as
marriages, jobs, and non-criminal social networks are important, there is
much less agreement as to how offenders come upon such opportunities.
One of the most intellectually dominant theories in the field of desistance,
Laub and Sampson's age-graded theory of informal social control,
essentially hypothesizes that the arrival of key events in the process of
221leading someone away from crime are exogenous. Our view is decidedly
influenced more by the conceptual framework of Giordano et al., who have
suggested that "turning points" like conventional jobs and marriages do not
arrive at random but require much initial "up front" work on the part of the
offender who wants to quit.224 In fact, the theoretical argument outlined
here is a theory of what such "up front" work entails, and how it leads to
conventional opportunities. Rather than focusing on the importance of
"turning points," then, we move attention backward to a consideration of
things like the "crystallization of discontent" which provides the motivation
for a change in one's identity.225
220 Id.
221 Giordano et al., Emotions and Crime, supra note.
222 E.g., MARUNA, supra note ; SHOVER, supra note ; WARR, supra note ; Farrall, supra
note ; Giordano et al., When Prediction Fails, supra note.
223 LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note.
224 Giordano et al., Gender, Crime, and Desistance, supra note.
225 See BAUMEISTER, supra note and accompanying text.
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Another area of important conceptual and theoretical development is
the role of human agency in desistance from crime. Laub and Sampson
have suggested that a non-trivial proportion of desistance comes about
almost without the effort of the person, so-called desistance by default, or
comes about almost against their will.226 The theory of identity change
outlined here does not imply that conventional institutions change people
but that desistance from crime is an intentional act of self-change which is
only later strengthened by structural realignments. Desistance comes about
when persons are dissatisfied with their working self as a criminal offender
and the preferences that are aligned with that identity and actively do
something about it. In our theory, once the decision to change one's self is
made, persons intentionally seek out conventional institutions like
legitimate jobs, stable marriages, and more conventional social networks.
Agency plays a fundamental role in our identity theory, and we here note
that criminologists need to begin to directly address the conceptual
questions about human agency such as exactly what agency is, what its
dimensions are, and how human agency can be operationalized.
Finally, we want to raise some analytical challenges for desistance
work. We have argued that our theory of desistance from crime can be
empirically tested by research along two tracks. One track is conventional
survey research based upon intensive interviews with ex-offenders. From
them we can gather information about working and possible selves, any
noticeable changes in identity, preferences, and social networks, and
whether such changes were preceded by a linking of perceived failures or
what we have called here the crystallization of discontent. With
conventional methodological tools like the life event calendar, researchers
can begin to link the subjective and objective experiences of ex-offenders
and piece together the importance of both types in the desistance process.
We have also, however, suggested that much could be learned about
desistance by examining individual-level time series offending data.
Criminologists are quite comfortable thinking about time series with
aggregate data but desistance can be captured with an individual time series
226 Laub and Sampson argued that "we believe that most offenders desist in response to
structurally induced turning points that serve as the catalyst for sustaining long-term
behavioral change." LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note , at 149. In the very next sentence, they
approvingly quote Howard Becker that
[a] structural explanation of personal change has implications for attempts to deliberately mold
human behavior. In particular, it suggests that we need not try to develop deep and lasting
interests, be they values or personality traits, in order to produce the behavior we want. It is
enough to create situations which will coerce people into behaving as we want them to and then
to create the conditions under which other rewards will become linked to continuing this
behavior.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Becker, supra note, at 53).
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of offending over a long period of time. Specifically, using offending data
that cover some forty years from individuals in the Cambridge Study in
Delinquency Development, we have illustrated that some important insights
can be gained about desistance from such individual time series. For
example, a non-stationary time series that can be described as a random
walk would be compatible with Laub and Sampson's characterization of the
desistance process as largely the result of a series of random events or
exogenous shocks.227  A non-stationary time series characterized by a
structural break where different causal factors have different impacts on
offending before and after the structural break would be friendly with our
identity theory of desistance. In fact, one way to think of the identity theory
described in this paper is as a theory of structural breaks. It argues that
identity changes initiate other changes such as shifts in preferences and
social realignments that reorder the importance of or weight attributed to
causal factors before and after the structural break. An examination of
individual level time series data (such as that illustrated above) therefore
can shed light on different theoretical models of how desistance comes
about.
As can be surmised, theorizing and research about desistance from
crime is one of the most exciting, vibrant, and dynamic areas in
criminology today.228 It is doubtful that a paper such as this could have
been written without a great deal of superb previous work which provided
the stimulus and the foundation for our own efforts today. Within this
intellectual context, we simply wish to both complement this previous work
and hopefully challenge criminologists to address some of the issues about
criminal desistance we have raised. While great strides have been made in
understanding why persons quit crime, there is still much that we do not
know.
227 id.
228 We sincerely thank one of the anonymous reviewers for reminding us of this very
important fact.
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